Dlaczego tylko odkrywać? Lekcje z obecnego kryzysu dla ekonomii i polityki gospodarczej

• Autorzy: Marek Belka

Warianty tytułu

Why Merely Discover? Lessons from the Current Crisis for Economics and Economic Policy

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Trwająca właściwie do dzisiaj dyskusja na temat przyczyn wielkiego kryzysu z okresu międzywojennego pokazuje, jak trudno sformułować na tego typu pytania odpowiedzi, które znalazłyby powszechną akceptację. Kryzysy, szczególnie o takiej skali, jak wspomniany wcześniej wielki kryzys z lat 30., bądź ten, którego końca obecnie wypatrujemy, prowadzą do intensywnie zadawanych pytań "dlaczego", głównie chyba z tego powodu, że pojawienie się takich zjawisk nie było oczekiwane (przynajmniej przez ekonomię głównego nurtu i opartą na niej politykę gospodarczą). Dla wielu obserwatorów oznacza to oczywiście słabości i braki tworzących ten główny nurt koncepcji i modeli ekonomicznych. Odkrywanie przyczyn kryzysów, również tego ostatniego, nie jest jednak zadaniem prostym, także i z tego powodu, że kryzys ma złożoną naturę. Co więcej, chęć zachowania poprawnej metodyki badań ekonomicznych w poszukiwaniu odpowiedzi na pytanie o przyczynę oznacza najprawdopodobniej, że odpowiedź ta musi mieć postać zestawu stosunkowo wielu odpowiedzi na pytania o skutki zjawisk podejrzewanych o bycie przyczynami kryzysu. (fragment tekstu)

EN

The more progressive of current trends in economics and policymaking outlined in the paper reflect a welcome shift away from the entrenched practice of positing and proving abstruse macroeconomic models and articulating the anticipated consequences of policy decisions, and towards an approach that sets out to more rigorously identify the causality underlying economic phenomena and, more importantly, contribute in a meaningful way to resolving pressing practical problems. This is cause for guarded optimism because as the ongoing debate on the causal factors behind the current, persistent crisis continues to expose the gaps and inadequacies of mainstream economic models and concepts, so too is a re-examination of the State's regulatory impact on the financial sector taking place. Notable in this regard is questioning the validity of such pre-crisis legislation-shaping assumptions as financial market efficiency, as well as positing that banking sector regulations should be differentiated across varying categories of bank operating models, or applying to the introduction of new financial instruments procedures modeled after regulatory mechanisms that govern the pharmaceutical industry's marketing of drugs. The caveat downgrading the degree of optimism comprises such factors as the lethargic pace of introduction of the European banking union, regulatory divergence between the US and Europe, as well as the sluggish pace and varied scope of adopting Basel III solutions across jurisdictions. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Kryzys finansowy; Przyczyny kryzysu; Zapobieganie kryzysowi; Makroekonomia; Rola państwa w gospodarce; Sektor finansowy

EN

Financial crisis; Causes of crisis; Crisis prevention; Macroeconomics; States' role in economy; Financial sector

• Czasopismo: Bezpieczny Bank
• Rocznik: 2013
• Numer: nr 4 (53)
• Strony: 7--18

Twórcy

autor

Marek Belka

• Narodowy Bank Polski

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