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Czasopismo
2014 | nr 2 | 301--320
Tytuł artykułu

Granice globalizacji: przypadek strefy euro

Warianty tytułu
Boundaries of Globalization: the Case of the Euro Zone
Języki publikacji
PL
Abstrakty
Celem artykułu jest uwypuklenie przyczyn braku dostatecznie efektywnych mechanizmów redystrybucji dochodów w strefie euro, które - gdyby istniały -mogłyby ochronić strefę euro przed kryzysem fiskalnym. W pierwszej części artykułu przypominam, że założenia, jakie przyjęto w okresie tworzenia strefy euro, pozwoliły uznać, iż unia monetarna może funkcjonować bez mechanizmu redystrybucji dochodów. W drugiej części podkreślam, że główną przyczyną kryzysu zadłużeniowego w strefie euro nie była polityka budżetowa państw członkowskich, lecz niestabilne boomy kredytowe, których załamanie się przyniosło recesję i skokowy wzrost wielkości deficytów budżetowych. W trzeciej części wskazuję, że jedyny mechanizm redystrybucji dochodów, na jaki na razie zdecydowano się w strefie euro, ma stanowić unia bankowa. Zdecydowano się jednak na taką konstrukcję unii bankowej, która w dużej mierze petryfikuje europejski system bankowy w jego dotychczasowej postaci, co tworzy ryzyko powtórzenia się kryzysów bankowych w przyszłości. W czwartej części piszę o konieczności uwzględniania przez reguły unijne specyfiki tworzących ją gospodarek. W zakończeniu formułuję wnioski końcowe. (fragment tekstu)
EN
Intensification of globalization is achieved at the cost of limiting the scope of autonomy of economic policy at the national level. This produces a trade-off between the benefits derived from globalization and the costs caused by resigning from possibility to conduct autonomous policy to keep the economy on an equilibrium growth path. The costs of limited autonomy of domestic economic policy grow during a time of crisis. The possibility to reduce these costs depends on international political cooperation that would enable to create mechanisms of income distribution towards countries particularly hit by a crisis. The euro zone crisis illustrated this relationship in a spectacular way. Deficiency of political cooperation made it impossible to create an effective mechanism that would enable financial assistance to some euro-zone countries most hit by the crisis, which in effect have suffered considerable costs of their earlier resignation from possibility to conduct autonomous stabilization policy. (original abstract)
Czasopismo
Rocznik
Numer
Strony
301--320
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
  • Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie
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Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
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Identyfikator YADDA
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