On constructive methods for equilibrium modelling on dynamic oligopolistic markets under uncertainty

• Autorzy: Paweł Dziewulski , Łukasz Woźny
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Our discussion focuses on constructive aspects of methods proposed in the literature for the analysis of equilibria in such markets. Specifically, we present results concerning numerical properties of methods of equilibrium calculation in the models with and without strategic interactions, including cases of the finite or infinite number of players. The study concludes with a summary to indicate the future research areas and selected thematic literature. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Economic equilibrium; Modeling uncertainty; Mathematical models; Uncertainty

PL

Równowaga gospodarcza; Modelowanie niepewności; Modele matematyczne; Niepewność

• Czasopismo: Journal of Management and Financial Sciences
• Rocznik: 2012
• Tom: 5
• Numer: nr 7
• Strony: 7--33

Twórcy

autor

Paweł Dziewulski

• University of Oxford, United Kingdom

autor

Łukasz Woźny

• Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie

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