Too-Big-to-Fail Status and Interest Costs of Banks : the Evidence from Central European Countries

• Autorzy: Krzysztof Jackowicz , Oskar Kowalewski , Łukasz Kozłowski
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The article explores whether the TBTF status influences interest costs reported by banks in Central European countries. We use a comprehensive dataset covering the period from 1994 to 2009 and the different methods of identifying TBTF banks. After controlling for other determinants of interest costs, we find very little evidence that the big banks in Central European countries incur lower interest costs. Our results are robust to the changes in the estimation procedures. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Banking; Deposit market; Costs

PL

Bankowość; Rynek depozytów; Koszty

• Czasopismo: Zarządzanie i Finanse
• Rocznik: 2013
• Numer: R. 11, nr 2, cz. 1
• Strony: 208--220

Twórcy

autor

Krzysztof Jackowicz

• Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie

autor

Oskar Kowalewski

• Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie

autor

Łukasz Kozłowski

• BGŻ SA

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