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Paper compares two major schools of economic thought - neoclassical and evolutionary - from the perspective of keystone assumption: rationality of economic agents. It discusses role of rationality assumption in neoclassical and evolutionary theories; importance of expectations; and perspectives for analyzing them within the framework of evolutionary game theory - namely, through replicator dynamics.(original abstract)
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15
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Bibliografia
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Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
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bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171306203