Problem stabilnych małżeństw czyli o pożytkach z teorii gier płynących

• Autorzy: Katarzyna Ostasiewicz
• Języki publikacji: PL

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Teoria gier; Ekonomia; Alokacja zasobów

EN

Game theory; Economics; Resource allocation

• Czasopismo: Śląski Przegląd Statystyczny
• Rocznik: 2012
• Numer: nr 10 (16)
• Strony: 131--152

Twórcy

autor

Katarzyna Ostasiewicz

• Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu

Bibliografia

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