Polityka wynagradzania kadry kierowniczej w sektorze bankowym w świetle wyników badań empirycznych

• Autorzy: Piotr Urbanek

Warianty tytułu

Top Executives Remuneration Policy in the Banking Sector: an Assessment of Empirical Research

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

W artykule została podjęta próba reasumpcji wyników badań empirycznych poświęconych problematyce polityki wynagradzania kadry menedżerskiej w sektorze finansowym. Obecny kryzys finansowy stanowi znaczącą cezurę, jeśli chodzi o podejście do badania wynagrodzeń w sektorze bankowym. Porównanie badań prowadzonych przez wybuchem kryzysu z badaniami prowadzonymi w okresie, kiedy ujawnione zostały dysfunkcjonalności polityki wynagradzania, wskazuje na znaczącą reorientację zainteresowań badaczy zajmujących się tą problematyką. Kluczowy z punktu widzenia identyfikacji przyczyn kryzysu problem ryzyka generowanego przez politykę wynagradzania stał się najważniejszym zagadnieniem poruszanym w badaniach prowadzonych po wybuchu kryzysu. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

The aim of this paper is to present results of empirical investigations focused on the issue of top executives remuneration policy in the banking sector. The current financial crisis has changed approach in such research. Relationship between the bank CEOs' compensation and risk-taking, crucial in attempts to analyze and interpret cause of the crisis, has become the most important problem in investigations conducted after the outbreak of the crisis. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Wynagrodzenia; Kadra kierownicza; Sektor bankowy; Kryzys finansowy; Wyniki badań

EN

Remuneration; Managerial staff; Banking sector; Financial crisis; Research results

• Czasopismo: Zarządzanie i Finanse
• Rocznik: 2013
• Numer: R. 11, nr 2, cz. 6
• Strony: 260--273

Twórcy

autor

Piotr Urbanek

• Uniwersytet Łódzki

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