Testowanie teorii objaśniających politykę dywidend

• Autorzy: Elżbieta Maria Wrońska

Warianty tytułu

Dividend Policy - Review of Empirical Test

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Celem niniejszego opracowania jest weryfikacja postrzegania potrzeby wypłaty dywidend oraz przesłanek wypłaty dywidend uwzględniających założenia najważniejszych teorii polityki dywidend z punktu widzenia dyrektorów finansowych podmiotów wypłacających dywidendy. (fragment tekstu)

EN

This paper presents the outcome of the survey on dividend policy carried out in 7 companies. Corporate dividend policy has captured the interest of economists of this century and over the last five decades has been the subject of intensive theoretical modeling and empirical examination. A number of conflicting theoretical models define attempts to explain corporate dividend behavior. The survey showed that financial managers are convinced that investors want dividends. The managers are aware that there is short-term reaction of stock prices on dividends. Financial managers think that paying dividends gives good publicity. However, financial managers believe that not paying dividends could retain cash and increase equity. It is possible to picture a financial manager that is unwilling to pay dividends but aware that paying dividends is important for shareholders and important for company because of good publicity. The survey showed that assumptions mentioned in signaling theory, agency theory and behavioral finance theory are the most important factors taken into account by financial managers. The less important are assumptions connected with irrelevant theory and tax theory. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Dywidenda; Finanse przedsiębiorstwa; Wyniki badań; Polityka dywidend

EN

Dividend; Enterprise finance; Research results; Dividend policy

• Czasopismo: Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Sectio H. Oeconomia
• Rocznik: 2011
• Tom: 45
• Numer: nr 1
• Strony: 141--149

Twórcy

autor

Elżbieta Maria Wrońska

• Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej w Lublinie

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