Modele mechanizmów i ich rola w wyjaśnianiu w ekonomii

• Autorzy: Łukasz Hardt

Warianty tytułu

Models of Mechanisms and their Role in Building Economic Explanations

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Ekonomiści wyjaśniając zjawiska gospodarcze często odwołują się do pojęcia mechanizmu. W rezultacie, ważnym narzędziem badawczym ekonomii są modele mechanizmów. Celem artykułu jest analiza tego, czym są tego rodzaju modele, a także, jaki status epistemologiczny posiadają budowane na ich bazie stwierdzenia teoretyczne. Kwestie te omawiane są przy wykorzystaniu wybranych koncepcji filozofii nauki, w tym filozofii ekonomii. Artykuł odwołuje się też do historii ekonomii, gdy wskazuje na przyczyny popularności mechanicystycznych wyjaśnień w tej nauce. Rozważania metodologiczne zawarte w tekście ilustrowane są odniesieniami do dwóch modeli ekonomicznych - modelu segregacji rasowej T. Schellinga (1978) i modelu wyprzedaży H. Variana (1980). Jedną z podstawowych konkluzji artykułu jest konstatacja, iż prawa ekonomiczne formułowane na bazie modeli mechanizmów mają status jedynie przekonań o świecie (beliefs), a nie stwierdzeń o istnieniu uniwersalnych regularności. Ponadto, przekonania te są tym bardziej wiarygodne, im struktura modelu cechuje się większym stopniem izomorfizmu z tą istniejącą w rzeczywistości. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

Economists often refer to mechanisms in explaining economic phenomena. Therefore, models of mechanisms play an important role in economics. The goal of the paper is to investigate of what kind of entities such models are and what is the epistemological status of theoretical claims built upon them. These issues are analyzed from the perspective provided by the general philosophy of sciences, including philosophical studies on economics. The paper refers also to the history of economics while accounting for the popularity of mechanistic explanations in this particular science. Methodological studies here presented are illustrated by references to the chessboard model by T. Schelling (1978) and a model a sales by H. Varian (1980). The paper concludes that theoretical claims built upon models have the status of beliefs rather than claims about universal regularities. Moreover, the closer the structure of such a model to the structure of its target, the more credible such a model is. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Mechanizmy rynkowe; Modele ekonomiczne; Metodologia ekonomii; Filozofia ekonomii; Izomorfizm

EN

Market mechanism; Economic models; Economic methodology; Philosophy of economics; Isomorphism

• Czasopismo: Ekonomia / Uniwersytet Warszawski
• Rocznik: 2014
• Numer: nr 37
• Strony: 79--103

Twórcy

autor

Łukasz Hardt

• Uniwersytet Warszawski

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