Non-Utilitarian Consequentialism: A History of the Last Decades

• Autorzy: Vasil Gluchman
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The growing importance of the non-utilitarian consequentialism since the early 1980s stems from renewed efforts to respond to the criticism of traditional utilitarian and consequentialist utilitarianism.1 Despite the fact that non-utilitarian consequentialism started almost 20 years ago, it cannot be considered as fully established ethical theory. One of the essential reasons for this that non-utilitarian consequentialism is rejected by some utilitarians who hold that consequentialism is utilitarianism and any attempt to develop a non-utilitarian consequentialist theory should be considered outside consequentialism.(fragment of text)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Ethics; Morality; History of philosophy

PL

Etyka; Moralność; Historia filozofii

• Czasopismo: Humanum. Międzynarodowe Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne
• Rocznik: 2008
• Numer: nr 1 (1)
• Strony: 55--72

Twórcy

autor

Vasil Gluchman

Bibliografia

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