On Subjectivity and Objectivity in the Social Sciences
In this paper we try to answer the question in what sense social sciences are subjective and in what sense they are objective. We examine only some aspects of this problem. First, we address the question of intersubjectivity, mainly with the ideas of philosopher K. R. Popper. We proceed by proposing the following working definition of objectivity: we understand objective facts as true propositions, the truth of which are independent from a particular observer. We ask whether facts of social sciences are objective in this sense. Then we examine some possible objections to proposed claims and also some aspects of subjectivity of social sciences. We are concerned with the following issues: distribution, imperfection and inconsistency of concrete human knowledge, importance of human purposes, beliefs and opinions and of relations between people or relations of people to things in social sciences. Regarding these problems we are dealing mainly with the work of F. A. Hayek. We also try to show that claims we made about objectivity and subjectivity of social sciences are not contrary to each other(original abstract)
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