The Evolution of US Merger Control Policy - part 1 : 1890-1973

• Autorzy: Magdalena Katarzyna Kąkol
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The aim of the study is to present the changes in US merger control policy at different stages of development of competition theories and views on pro- and anti-competitive effects of mergers (especially Harvard, Chicago, and Post-Chicago Schools of Competition). The research methods used in the study include literature review as well as the in-depth analysis of US legislation, antitrust agencies' enforcement policy and federal courts' case-law with focus on changes in the economic analysis of mergers and their impact on market competition. The first part of the study covers the years 1890-1973. Apart from explaining some procedural issues it highlights the early days of merger control policy in the United States with an emphasis on the creation of antitrust legislation and institutional framework for its enforcement. In 1890-1950 the antitrust authorities' approach to mergers was generally friendly as large enterprises were supposed to play an important role contributing to the development and international expansion of the US economy. However, together with a surging increase in concentration in the US market and with the emergence of new competition theories that focused their research on market structure (Harvard School) this approach changed for the very interventionist (1950-1973). At that time the main purpose of merger control policy was to preserve competitors and small businesses rather than to improve consumer welfare, economic efficiencies or to protect competition process. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Mergers and acquisitions; Economic history; Legislation; Competition theory; Antitrust policy; Chicago School

PL

Fuzje i przejęcia; Historia gospodarcza; Prawodawstwo; Teoria konkurencji; Polityka antymonopolowa; Chicagowska szkoła ekonomii

• Czasopismo: Ekonomia i Prawo
• Rocznik: 2014
• Tom: 13
• Numer: nr 3
• Strony: 403--415

Twórcy

autor

Magdalena Katarzyna Kąkol

• Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, Poland

Bibliografia

• Agnew J., The United States in the World Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987.
• Areeda Ph., Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, Cases, Little Brown, Boston, 1967.
• Bain J.S., Relation of Profit - Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufactur-ing, 1936-1940, "Quarterly Journal of Economics", Vol. 65, Issue 3/1951, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1882581.
• Baldwin W.L., Market Power, Competition and Antitrust Policy, Irwin, Homewood, Illinois 1987.
• Ballam D.A., The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in the United States: Colonial Times to Present, "American Business Law Journal", Vol. 31, Is-sue 4/1994, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-1714.1994.tb00844.x.
• Bok D.C., Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, "Har-vard Law Review", Vol. 74, Issue 2/1960, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1338755.
• Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
• Davidson K.M., Megamergers, Corporate America's Billion Dollar Takeovers, Beard Books, Washington 2003.
• Elhauge E., Geradin D., Global Competition Law and Economics, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2008.
• FTC and DoJ, Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Report. Fiscal Year 2012, Bureau of Competition of FTC and Antitrust Division of DoJ, April 2013.
• FTC, Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1948, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1949.
• Gellhorn E., James Ch.A., Pogue R., Sims J., Has Antitrust Outgrown Dual Enforce-ment? A Proposal for Rationalization, [in:] T.P. Kovaleff (ed.), The Antitrust Im-pulse: An Economic, Historical, and Legal Analysis, Vol. 1, ME Sharpe, New York 1994.
• Harty R.P., Unites States, [in:] J. Davies (ed.), Merger Control 2014, Getting the Deal Through in association with: Global Competition Review, London, 6 September 2013.
• Hildebrand D., The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules, Second Edition, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, London, New York 2002.
• Leddy M., Cook Ch., Abell J., Eclair-Heath G., Transatlantic Merger Control: The Courts and the Agencies, "Cornell International Law Journal", Vol. 43, No. 1/2010.
• Mousis N., Access to European Union: law, economics, policies, 15th revised edition, European Study Service, Rixensart 2006.
• Mucha-Leszko B., Rozwój powiązań w gospodarce światowej - etapy globalizacji i regionalizacja procesów gospodarczych, [in:] B. Mucha-Leszko (ed.), Współczesna gospodarka światowa. Główne centra gospodarcze, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2005.
• Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
• Sheperd W.G., The Economics of Industrial Organization, Second Edition, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey 1985.
• Sheperd W.G., The Twilight of Antitrust, "Antitrust Law and Economics Review", No. 18/1986.
• Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 US 1 (1911).
• United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 US 106 (1911).
• United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
• United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 US 290 (1897).
• United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
• US DoJ, Merger Guidelines 1968, http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.htm (30.09.2013).
• Valentine D., The Evolution of U.S. Merger Law, Prepared remarks of Assistant Director for International Antitrust, Federal Trade Commission, before INDECOPI Con-ference, Lima, August 13, 1996.
• Whish R., Competition Law, Fifth Edition, Lexis Nexis, London 2003.
• Wilson J., Globalization and the Limits of National Merger Control Laws, Kluwer In-ternational, The Hague, London, New York, 2003.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.12775/EiP.2014.029