IPO Initial Underpricing Anomaly : the Election Gimmick Hypothesis

• Autorzy: Adam Zaremba , Radosław Żmudziński

Warianty tytułu

Anomalia nadwyżkowych natychmiastowych stóp zwrotu po debiutach : hipoteza kiełbasy wyborczej

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The relationship between political motivations and underpricing of public offerings of privatized companies is to a great extend unexplored field in the global academic literature. In this paper we offer a new explanation for the IPO underpricing anomaly. We formulate the election gimmick hypothesis, which states that in order to please the voters the treasury may be motivated to leave some money on the table during the IPOs of state-owned enterprises. We test the practical implications of the hypothesis. First we review the previous literature, next we perform empirical research based on a filtered sample of 250 IPOs on the Polish market in years 2005-2013. We examine the abnormal returns in the sample and employing some regression - and simulation- -based methods we examine the sources and variation in underpricing. Our findings suggest that the IPOs of state-owned enterprises are more underpriced than remaining ones and that there is more money left on the table in the months preceding elections. (original abstract)

Zależności pomiędzy motywacjami politycznymi a niedoszacowaniem ofert pierwotnych prywatyzowanych spółek stanowi w znacznej mierzenie niezbadany obszar. W niniejszym artykule zaproponowane zostaje nowe częściowe wyjaśnienie dla anomalii nadwyżkowych natychmiastowych stóp zwrotu po debiucie. Sformułowana zostaje "hipotezę kiełbasy wyborczej", która zakłada, że przed wyborami skarb państwa może być zmotywowany, aby celowo "pozostawiać pieniądze na stole" podczas prywatyzacji przedsiębiorstw państwowych. Po dokonaniu przeglądu literatury, przeprowadzone zostają badania empiryczne na przefiltrowanej próbie 250 IPO na polskim rynku kapitałowym w latach 2005-2013. Przy pomocy analizy regresji i metod symulacyjnych, przebadane zostają nadwyżkowe stopy zwrotu oraz źródła ich przekrojowej zmienności. Wyniki badań wskazują, że prywatyzowane spółki państwowe podczas debiutów charakteryzują się większym niedoszacowaniem aniżeli pozostałe firmy, oraz że w miesiącach poprzedzających wybory "na stole pozostawiane jest więcej pieniędzy" dla inwestorów. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Initial Public Offering (IPO); Rate of return; Stock market; Underpricing

PL

Pierwsza oferta publiczna; Stopa zwrotu; Giełda papierów wartościowych; Niedoszacowanie cen akcji

• Czasopismo: Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting
• Rocznik: 2014
• Tom: 3
• Numer: nr 2
• Strony: 167--181

Twórcy

autor

Adam Zaremba

• Poznań University of Economics, Poland

autor

Radosław Żmudziński

• Poznań University of Economics, Poland

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.12775/CJFA.2014.025