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2014 | 24 | nr 3 | 59--76
Tytuł artykułu

A Game Theoretical Study of Generalised Trust and Reciprocation in Poland : I. Theory and Experimental Design

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Although studies using experimental game theory have been carried out in various countries, no such major study has occurred in Poland. The study described here aims to investigate generalized trust and reciprocation among Polish students. In the literature, these traits are seen to be positively correlated with economic growth. Poland is regarded as the most successful post-soviet bloc country in transforming to a market economy but the level of generalised trust compared to other postcommunist countries is reported to be low. This study aims to see to what degree this reported level of generalised trust is visible amongst young Poles via experimental game theory, along with a questionnaire. The three games to be played have been described. Bayesian equilibria illustrating behavior observed in previous studies have been derived for two of these games and the experimental procedure has been described. (original abstract)
Opis fizyczny
  • Wrocław University of Economics, Poland
  • Wrocław University of Technology
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