Telecommunications Services Market in the Light of the Agency Theory and the Transaction Cost Theory under New Institutional Economics : Case for Poland

• Autorzy: Piotr Szkudlarek
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The main objective of the paper is to evaluate the telecommunications services market in Poland, focusing on its regulation in the context of the Agency Theory and the Transaction Cost Theory under New Institutional Economics (hereinafter NIE). In the following sections of the paper, selected aspects concerning institutional economics, particularly institutions are presented. Next, the key issues related to the Agency Theory and the Transaction Cost Theory under New Institutional Economics are described. The theories are a basis for the evaluation of the telecommunications services market in Poland shown in the final part of the paper. The aim of the paper is to identify and analyse key aspects of regulation as a means of the state's influence on the economy. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Institutional economics; Agency theory; Telecommunication; Transaction cost theory

PL

Ekonomia instytucjonalna; Teoria agencji; Telekomunikacja; Teoria kosztów transakcyjnych

• Czasopismo: Journal of International Studies
• Rocznik: 2014
• Tom: 7
• Numer: nr 3
• Strony: 70--80

Twórcy

autor

Piotr Szkudlarek

• University of Szczecin, Poland

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.14254/2071-8330.2014/7-3/6