Political Corruption and Electoral Systems Seen with Economists' Lenses

• Autorzy: Joanna Dzionek-Kozłowska

Warianty tytułu

Ekonomiczne analiza zależności pomiędzy korupcją a kształtem systemów wyborczych

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The ongoing process of democratisation lead to the growing importance of the electoral systems that regulate the procedures of gaining and legitimizing power in democracy. Taking it into account it is worth asking about the relationship between these particular 'game rules' contained into electoral law and the respect of the rule of law, being one of the basic norms of a democratic system. A question then may be raised about the existence and the character of the relation between electoral systems and the level of political corruption. It is worth noticing that besides the research conducted by political scientists and the representatives of various branches of social sciences the significant analysis of the issue have been presented by the economists. In this article a brief overview of the economic studies on the relationship between level of political corruption and the electoral systems is presented so as to assess to what degree this approach may be treated as fruitful. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Corruption; Political system; Voting system; Democracy

PL

Korupcja; System polityczny; System wyborczy; Demokracja

• Czasopismo: Annales : etyka w życiu gospodarczym
• Rocznik: 2014
• Tom: 17
• Numer: nr 4
• Strony: 79--92

Twórcy

autor

Joanna Dzionek-Kozłowska

• University of Lodz, Poland

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Identyfikatory

DOI

11089/6028