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Niniejszy artykuł przedstawia strukturę własności jako mechanizmu nadzorczego. Punktem wyjścia do analizy jest teoria agencji (Jensen i Meckling, 1976; Fama i Jen- sen, 1983a; Fama i Jensen, 1983b; Shleifer i Vishy, 1997), pojmująca przedsiębiorstwo jako sieć kontraktów (związków agencji), które zostały spisane przez uczestników (pryncypała i agenta, czyli tu menedżera i udziałowca) w tym celu, by usprawnić współpracę między nimi i redukować sprzeczne interesy, występujące między stronami kontraktu. Sprzeczność interesów wynika przede wszystkim z innych możliwości dywersyfikacji ryzyka, horyzontu analizy, rozkładu kosztów działań oraz indywidualnie obranych celów, co jest dodatkowo potęgowane asymetrią informacyjną i niekompletnością kontraktów (por. Aluchna, 2002). W praktyce wykorzystuje się wiele różnorodnych mechanizmów nadzorczych, bazujących na regulacjach prawnych, konkurencji, umowach zawieranych między zainteresowanymi stronami, obowiązujących normach i obyczajach. (fragment tekstu)
Słowa kluczowe
Czasopismo
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Strony
126--147
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
autor
- Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie
Bibliografia
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Bibliografia
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