Zastosowanie iteracyjnego modelu dylematu więźnia do wyjaśnienia mechanizmu nadużyć księgowych w spólkach giełdowych

Czasopismo

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• Autorzy: Waldemar Stronka

Warianty tytułu

Application of the Iterated Prisonerʹs Dilemma Model to the Explanation of the Accounting Misuse Mechanism in Listed Companies

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Przytoczone w artykule symulacje umożliwiają lepsze zrozumienie mechanizmów prowadzącyh do podwyzszonego wzrostu popularności nadużyć księgowych w spółkach. Wydaje się również, iż taka analiza może mieć istotne znaczenie dla inwestorów oraz instytucji regulujących - pośrednio i bezpośrednio - funkcjonowanie rynków giełdowych. (fragment tekstu)

EN

The paper is linked with the best-known agent simulation model - the iterated prisoner's dilemma model. The classic version of the model was modified by introducing two corrections: an 'analysis cost' and a 'noise in identification'. This simple model enabled to conduct an analysis of a recent phenomenon of rapid increase in a number of 'creative accounting' practices. It seems that the analysis could have been of crucial importance for investors and institutions regulating - directly and indirectly - capital market activities. As a result of the analysis, changes in the law - such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act - could have been made a lot earlier than after companies of Enron and WorldCom went bankrupt. From the investors' point of view, their awareness of 'creative accounting' attractiveness for executives could have influenced their investment decisions. They were able, for example, to apply an investment strategy based on identifying symptoms of 'creative accounting' in order to short-sell shares of companies suspected by them of these practices. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Spółki giełdowe; Księgowy; Nadużycia gospodarcze; Księgowość

EN

Stock market companies; Accountant; Economic frauds; Bookkeeping

• Czasopismo: ---
• Strony: 187--204

Twórcy

autor

Waldemar Stronka

Bibliografia

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