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2013 | nr 32 Mechanism design and related topics | 55--76
Tytuł artykułu

The Terms of Cooperation's Stability. What is the Reason of Flow between Coalitions?

Warianty tytułu
Warunki stabilności porozumień, czyli od czego zależą przepływy graczy między koalicjami
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
W artykule przedstawiam jedno z zastosowan modeli teoriogrowych do opisu i wyjasnienia warunków stabilnosci tworzonych koalicji. Prezentowane podejscie bazuje na analizie indeksów siły. Ich badanie pozwala na okreslanie subaddytywnosci badz superaddytywnosci koalicji. Przedstawiam równiez zastosowanie modelu gier oceanicznych do badania stabilnosci porozumien w zgromadzeniach z duza liczba graczy. Prezentacje ilustruje wynikami badania procesów decyzyjnych w Sejmie RP oraz w zgromadzeniu delegatów podczas prawyborów w Partii Demokratycznej w USA przed wyborami prezydenckimi w roku 2008. Uzyskane wyniki pozwalaja na zgodne z intuicjami interpretacje dobrze wyjasniajace obserwowane zjawiska w zgromadzeniach decyzyjnych. (abstrakt oryginalny)
EN
The following article presents an application of game-theoretical models, meant to describe and explain the conditions of stability of coalitions created within decision-making bodies. The basis of the presented approach is the concept of power indices, as well as subadditivity and superadditivity of coalitions. The article also illustrates how to apply the model of oceanic games for analyzing assemblies consisting of many participants. These studies are exemplified by the results of research on the decision-making processes in the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish parliament) and among delegates of the 2008 U.S. presidential nominations of the Democratic Party, which lead to clear, intuitive interpretations, useful for explanations of processes occurring within the decision-making bodies. (original abstract)
Twórcy
  • Uniwersytet Warszawski
Bibliografia
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  • Milnor J.W., Shapley L.S. (1961), Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games, RM-2649, Rand Corporation, Reprint "Mathematics of Operations Research" 3 (1978), No. 4, pp. 290-307.
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  • Shapley L.S. (1961), Values of Large Games III: A Corporation with Two Large Stockholders, RM-2650-PR, Rand Corporation, Reprint as a part of Milnor, J.W., Shapley L.S. (1978), Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games in: "Mathematics of Operations Research" 3(1978), No. 4, pp. 290-307.
  • Shapley L.S. (1977), A comparison of power indices and a non-symmetric generalization, RAND Paper P-5872, Rand Corporation Santa Monica.
  • Słomczynski W., Poznanski P., Haranczyk G., Sokołowski J.K. (2008), Integrity of parliamentary groups in: Sokołowski J., Poznanski P. (ed.) Chosen aspects of the Sejm activities in the years 1997-2007, Cracow, AFM Printing House, pp. 203-235.
  • Sosnowska H. (1995), Shapley value of games with a priori unions as method of analysis of elections in Poland 1989-94, "Works on mathematical economy" No. 1/EM/96, Warsaw, Warsaw School of Economics.
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  • Wieczorek A. (2005), Large Games with Only Small Players and Strategy Sets in Euclidean Spaces, "Applicationes Mathematicae" No. 32, pp. 183-193.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
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