Czasopismo
Tytuł artykułu
Autorzy
Warianty tytułu
The Theory of Deferred Acceptance and the Theory of the Right Proportions
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
W pracy przedstawiono dwie teorie ekonomiczne i porównano je: jedna dotyczy doboru partnerów i określana jest jako teoria odroczonej akceptacji, a druga to teoria właściwych proporcji. Pierwsza opisuje procedurę dopasowywania, a druga dostosowania. (abstrakt oryginalny)
In the paper two economic theories are presented and compared: one concerns the process of selecting partners and is referred to as the theory of deferred acceptance, the other one is the theory of the right proportions. The first one describes the procedure of adjustment while the second one the procedure of adaptation. (original abstract)
Rocznik
Strony
63--78
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
Bibliografia
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- Roth A.E., Deferred Acceptance Algorithms. History, Theory, Practice and Open Questions, Working Paper 13225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge 2007, www.nber.org/papers/w13225 (20.03.2013).
- Roth A.E., The Origins, History and Design of the Resident Match, "Journal of the American Medical Association" 2003, no. 289.
- Sömez T., Unver M.U., Matching Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources, "Handbook of Social Economics" 2009, vol. 1A, http://ssrn.com/abstract (20.03.2013).
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171361537