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2009 | 3 | nr 74 Mikroekonomia i ekonomia instytucjonalna | 329--345
Tytuł artykułu

Znaczenie ram instytucjonalnych dla efektywności regulacji rynków infrastrukturalnych

Warianty tytułu
The Meaning of Institutional Structures for the Efficiency of Regulation of Infrastructure Markets
Języki publikacji
PL
Abstrakty
W ekonomii występuje wiele koncepcji wyjaśniania efektów ekonomicznych państwowej regulacji rynków. Celem artykułu jest prezentacja koncepcji i wyników badań empirycznych zmierzających do wyjaśnienia wpływu otoczenia instytucjonalnego na efektywność regulacji rynków infrastrukturalnych. (abstrakt oryginalny)
EN
The economic literature presents a number of models that explain economic performance of regulation. The aim of this paper is presentation of theoretical and empirical research that explains how institutional environment affects the efficiency of regulation of infrastructure markets. (original abstract)
Twórcy
  • Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu
Bibliografia
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Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
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