Reguły ograniczające swobodę zaciągania długu publicznego

• Autorzy: Arkadiusz Babczuk

Warianty tytułu

Public Debt Oriented Fiscal Rules

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Przedmiotem niniejszego opracowania jest problem reguł fiskalnych ograniczających swobodę decydentów politycznych skłonnych do zaciągania długu publicznego wyższego niż optymalny. Przejawiają się one w postaci reguły ściśle zrównoważonego budżetu oraz limitów ilościowych określających dopuszczalny poziom deficytu lub długu publicznego. Wprowadzenie surowych norm ograniczających zadłużenie publiczne może jednak rodzić koszty w postaci zmniejszenia lub utraty zdolności stabilizowania cyklicznych wahań koniunktury oraz utraty możliwości elastycznego reagowania na szoki w zakresie dochodów oraz wydatków publicznych, może także kreować nadmierną zmienność stóp opodatkowania. Wielu badaczy twierdzi jednak, iż korzyści związane z wprowadzeniem wspomnianych regulacji przeważają nad negatywnymi następstwami. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

The topic of this article includes fiscal rules limiting public debt. The rules concern strict balance of the budget and strict budget, deficit or public debt targets. These rules are intended to limit the leeway of public decision-makers. On the whole, these rules appear to be efficient, but they bring about significant macroeconomic costs: partial or general loss of fiscal automatic stabilizers; they may also induce volatility of tax rates. However, many researchers claim advantages are bigger than costs. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Dług publiczny; Polityka fiskalna; Zarządzanie długiem

EN

Public debt; Fiscal policy; Debt management

• Czasopismo: Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu. Nauki o Finansach
• Rocznik: 2010
• Tom: 4
• Numer: nr 127
• Strony: 38--56

Twórcy

autor

Arkadiusz Babczuk

• Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu

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