Wpływ regulacji dotyczących ładu korporacyjnego na wynagrodzenia kadry kierowniczej w bankach w Polsce

• Autorzy: Agnieszka Słomka-Gołębiowska , Piotr Urbanek

Warianty tytułu

The Impact of Corporate Governance Regulations on Executive Remuneration in the Polish Banking Sector

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Polityka wynagradzania kadry kierowniczej w instytucjach finansowych została uznana za jedną z głównych przyczyn ostatniego kryzysu finansowego. Reakcją na jej nieefektywność były liczne inicjatywy legislacyjne, mające na celu wzmacnianie istniejących i tworzenie nowych standardów ładu korporacyjnego. Nowe regulacje podkreślają rolę rady nadzorczej banku, a zwłaszcza jej komitetu ds. wynagrodzeń, w określaniu i monitorowaniu poziomu wynagrodzeń. Kładą nacisk na zróżnicowanie składu rady i uczestniczenie w nim członków niezależnych. W artykule podjęto próbę określenia, jaki był wpływ standardów ładu korporacyjnego, wprowadzonych w Polsce w 2012 r. do przepisów prawa, na wielkość wynagrodzeń członków zarządów banków. Badanie przeprowadzono na grupie 16 banków notowanych na giełdzie w Warszawie na podstawie danych za lata 2005-2013.(abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

Executive remuneration policy in financial institutions has been identified as one of the key factors that led to the recent financial crisis. In reaction to the ineffectiveness of this policy, numerous legislative initiatives are being introduced to strengthen the existing and create new standards of corporate governance. The new regulations emphasize the role of the bank's supervisory board, in particular its remuneration committee being responsible for designing and monitoring the level of executive pay. Similarly, the diversity of the supervisory board's composition and the participation of independent members are highlighted. The aim of the paper is to examine the impact of new standards of corporate governance introduced in Poland within the legal framework in force since the beginning of 2012 on the level of banks' domestic executive remuneration. The study was conducted on a group of 16 public banks on the basis of unique hand-collected data from 2005-2013.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Sektor bankowy; Ład korporacyjny; Kadra kierownicza; Kształtowanie wynagrodzeń; Wynagrodzenie za pracę; Wyniki badań

EN

Banking sector; Corporate governance; Managerial staff; Shaping remuneration; Remuneration for work; Research results

• Czasopismo: Bank i Kredyt
• Rocznik: 2015
• Numer: nr 4
• Strony: 327--356

Twórcy

autor

Agnieszka Słomka-Gołębiowska

• Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie

autor

Piotr Urbanek

• Uniwersytet Łódzki

Bibliografia

• Adams A. (2012), Governance and the financial crisis, International Review of Finance, 12(1), 7-38.
• Adams R., Ferreira D. (2009), Women in the board room and their impact on governance and performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 94, 291-309.
• Almazan A., Suarez J. (2003), Entrenchment and severance pay in optimal governance structures, Journal of Finance, 58(2), 519-548.
• Altunbas Y., Evans L., Molyneux P. (2001), Bank ownership and efficiency, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 33(4), 926-954.
• Amoako-Adu B., Baulkaran V., Smith B. (2011), Executive compensation in firms with concentrated control: the impact of dual class structure and family management, Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 1580-1594.
• Anderson R., Bizjak J. (2003), An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay, Journal of Banking and Finance, 27(7), 1323-1348.
• Bebchuk L., Fried J. (2004), Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation, Harvard University Press.
• Conyon M., Fernandes N., Ferreira M., Matos P., Murphy K.J. (2013), The executive compensation controversy: a transatlantic analysis, w: T. Boeri, C. Lucifora, K. Murphy (red.), Executive remuneration and employee performance-related pay: a transatlantic perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
• Core J., Holtausen R., Larcker D. (1999), Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 51, 371-406.
• Croci E., Halit G., Ozkan N. (2012), CEO compensation, family control, and institutional investors in continental Europe, Journal of Banking and Finance, 36(12), 3318-3335.
• Dalton D., Daily C., Johnson J., Ellstrand A. (1999), Number of directors and financial performance: a meta-analysis, Academy of Management, 42(6), 674-686.
• Davila A., Penalva F. (2006), Governance structure and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation, Review of Accounting Studies, 11(4), 463-493.
• Fernandes N., Ferreira M., Matos P., Murphy K. (2012), Are US CEOs paid more? An international perspective, SSRN Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1341639.
• Greene W. (2003), Econometrics analysis, Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
• Hartzel J., Starks L. (2003), Institutional investors and executive compensation, The Journal of Finance, 58(6), 2351-2374.
• Henderson A., Fredrickson J. (2001), Top management team coordination needs and the CEO pay gap: a competitive test of economic and behavioral views, Academy of Management Journal, 44, 96-117.
• Hermalin B. (2005), Trends in corporate governance, The Journal of Finance, 60(5), 2351-2384.
• Hermalin B., Weisbach M. (1998), Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO, American Economic Review, 88, 96-118.
• Huyghebaert N., Wang L. (2012), Expropriation of minority investors in Chinese listed firms: the role of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(3), 308-332.
• Jensen M. (1993), The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems, Journal of Finance, 48, 831-880.
• Kirkpatrick G. (2009), The corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis, Financial Market Trends, 2009/1, 61-87.
• Mizuno M., Tabner I. (2009), Corporate governance in Japan and the UK: codes, theory, and practice, Pacific Economic Review, 14, 622-638.
• Murphy K. (1985), Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: an empirical analysis, Journal of Accounting Economics, 7(3), 11-42.
• Murphy K. (1999), Executive compensation, w: O. Ashenfelter, D. Card (red.), Handbook of labor economics, vol. 3, North Holland, Amsterdam.
• Ozkan N. (2011), CEO compensation and firm performance: an empirical investigation of UK panel data, European Financial Management, 17(2), 260-285.
• Perry T., Zenner M. (2001), Pay for performance? Government regulation and the structure of compensation contracts, Journal of Financial Economics, 62(3), 453-488.
• Rhode D., Packel A. (2010), Diversity on corporate boards: How much difference does difference make?, Working Paper, 89, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University.
• Ryan H., Wiggins R. (2004), Whose is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring, Journal of Financial Economics, 73(3), 497-524.
• Słomka-Gołębiowska A., Urbanek P. (2014), Executive remuneration policy at banks in Poland after the financial crisis-evolution or revolution?, Comparative Economic Research, 7, 25-44.
• Słomka-Gołębiowska A. (2013), Uniform regulation of executive pay at banks: Will it make a difference? The case study of Poland, International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, doi: 10.1057/ jdg.2013.4.
• Urbanek P. (2011), Polityka wynagradzania menedżerów w sektorze finansowym a praktyka polskich banków - wnioski z kryzysu finansowego, Prace i Materiały Wydziału Zarządzania Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2/1, 493-512.
• Vafeas N. (2003), Further evidence on compensation committee composition as a determinant of CEO compensation, Financial Management, 32, 53-70.
• Vallascas F., Hangendorff J. (2013), CEO remuneration and bank default risk: evidence from the U.S. and Europe, Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 22(2), 47-89.
• Yermack D. (1996), Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors, Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 185-211.