Wykorzystanie instrumentów pochodnych a problem agencji

• Autorzy: Agnieszka Stróżyńska

Warianty tytułu

The Use of Derivatives and Agency Problem

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Celem artykułu jest syntetyczna prezentacja zależności zachodzących pomiędzy wykorzystaniem instrumentów pochodnych oraz występującym w przedsiębiorstwach problemem agencji i poziomem nadzoru korporacyjnego. W przedstawionym artykule dokonano systematyki wzajemnych relacji występujących pomiędzy problemem agencji oraz nadzorem korporacyjnym a wykorzystaniem derywatów z uwzględnieniem rzeczywistego motywu ich wykorzystania - zabezpieczenia przed ryzykiem lub spekulacji. Motywacją do przyjęcia tak postawionego celu stała się zauważalna w przeprowadzanych na świecie badaniach niejednoznaczność wskazań oraz nierzadko przeciwstawna interpretacja badanych zależności. W celu realizacji głównych zamierzeń, przeprowadzono studia literaturowe, dokonując przeglądu literatury anglojęzycznej. Wartością artykułu jest wytyczenie podstaw, na gruncie których możliwa stałaby się próba przełożenia teoretycznych i empirycznych wskazań na badania polskich spółek. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

The aim of this article is a synthetic presentation of the relationships between the usage of derivatives and the agency problem occurring in companies, and also corporate governance level. The paper presents the systematics of mutual relations existing between the agency problem; the level of corporate governance and the use of derivatives depending on the actual motive of their use - hedging or speculation. The motivation for its purpose became ambiguous indications and counterposed interpretation of surveyed dependencies frequently observable in the studies conducted in the world. Author carried out literature studies In order to achieve the main objective of article, reviewing the published research. The value of the article is to point out the grounds on the basis of which we can make an attempt to transfer the theoretical and empirical indications to Polish economy. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Teoria agencji; Instrumenty pochodne; Zarządzanie ryzykiem

EN

Agency theory; Derivatives; Risk management

• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia
• Rocznik: 2015
• Numer: nr 74 T.1 Rynek kapitałowy, wycena przedsiębiorstw, inwestycje
• Strony: 565--573

Twórcy

autor

Agnieszka Stróżyńska

• Iniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.18276/frfu.2015.74/1-49