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Tytuł artykułu
Autorzy
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
The objective of this paper is to use laboratory experiments to test the dynamic theory of free riding among the target shareholders during a takeover attempt. We construct our experiments to reflect the dynamics of unconditional bidding suggested by Harrington and Prokop (1993) and the dynamics of conditional bidding analyzed by Prokop (2003). The experimental results show that the observed tendering probabilities are higher than the theoretically predicted values in the case of unconditional bidding. Thus the actual behavior of shareholders is characterized by much less free riding than predicted by the theory of unconditional tender offers. In the case of conditional offers, the theoretical predictions for the tendering probabilities are confirmed by the laboratory behavior of shareholders in the case of multiple bidding. As suggested by the theory, the tendering probabilities are lower under multiple conditional bids than under unconditional offers. (original abstract)
Czasopismo
Rocznik
Tom
Numer
Strony
18--33
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
autor
- Warsaw School of Economics, Poland
autor
- Warsaw School of Economics, Poland
Bibliografia
- Bagnoli, M., Lipman, B.L. (1988), Successful takeovers without exclusion, Review of Financial Studies, 1, 89-110.
- Bradley, M., Desai, A., Kim, E.H. (1988), Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and their Division between the Shareholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, Journal of Business, 53, 345-376.
- Franks, J. R., Harris, R.S. (1989), Shareholder Wealth Effects of Corporate Takeovers: The U.K. Experience 1955-1985, Journal of Financial Economics, 23, 225-249.
- Grossman, S.J., Hart, O. (1980), Takeover bids, the free rider problem, and the theory of corporation, The Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42-64.
- Hamaguchi, Y., Hirota, S., Kawagoe, T., Saijo, T. (2003), Bounded Rationality Mitigates the Free-Riding Problem: An Experimental Study on Corporate Takeovers, Waseda University Working Paper.
- Harrington, J., Prokop, J. (1993), The dynamics of the free-rider problem in takeovers, Review of Financial Studies, 6, 851-882.
- Holmstrom, B., Nalebuff, B. (1992), To the raider goes the surplus? A reexamination of the free-rider problem, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1, 37-62.
- Kale, J., Noe, T. (1997), Unconditional and Conditional Takeover Offers: Experimental Evidence, Review of Financial Studies, 10, 735-766.
- Prokop, J. (2003), Conditional versus unconditional bidding in takeovers, Research in Economics, 57, 123-149.
- Tirole, J. (2006), The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
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Identyfikator YADDA
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