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2015 | nr 5 | 463--485
Tytuł artykułu

Koncepcje wąskiej bankowości (narrow banking) i ich krytyka

Warianty tytułu
The Moderate and Radical Narrow Banking Proposals and Their Critique
Języki publikacji
Artykuł przedstawia i systematyzuje dziewięć koncepcji systemu wąskiej bankowości (narrow banking). Analiza literatury przedmiotu wskazuje, że krytyka propozycji wąskiej bankowości z perspektywy dobrobytu deponentów nie jest dostatecznie uzasadniona. Poważne wyzwanie dla wąskiej bankowości stanowi natomiast konieczność zapewnienia stabilności systemu finansowego w szerokim ujęciu, pozbawionego ubezpieczenia depozytów. Najatrakcyjniejsza wydaje się koncepcja wąskiej bankowości zaproponowana przez Mertona i Bodiego (1993) i uzupełniona zaprezentowanym w poniższym artykule mechanizmem konwertowania depozytów na obligacje. (abstrakt oryginalny)
The article reviews and compares nine proposals for narrow banking. Although it is often argued that narrow banking would harm depositors' welfare, this claim does not find sufficient support in the literature. The actual challenge for narrow banking concepts comes from the need to ensure the stability of the broad financial system, absent deposit insurance. It seems that the most attractive narrow banking proposal is the one put forward by Merton and Bodie (1993). However, to stabilize the broad financial system this proposal should be supplemented with a mechanism of deposit conversion into bonds. (original abstract)
Opis fizyczny
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