Wybrane teorie umów kredytowych - przegląd badań

• Autorzy: Andrzej Paliński

Warianty tytułu

Theory of Loan Agreement: Overview of Studies

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

W praktyce gospodarczej jednakże nie spotyka się powszechnie umów uzależniających wysokość spłaty zadłużenia od stanów natury, czyli wyników przedsięwzięcia. Najczęściej zawieranym kontraktem dłużnym jest standardowa umowa kredytowa o stałej, z góry określonej kwocie spłaty, brak której prowadzi do przejęcia składników majątku dłużnika przez wierzyciela. Okazuje się, że na gruncie teorii agencji, w warunkach asymetrii informacyjnej i kosztów egzekwowania kontraktów, standardowa umowa kredytowa jest optymalną formą umowy dłużnej. Na realizację tej umowy wpływają dodatkowo: wartość zabezpieczenia, możliwość renegocjacji i długookresowość relacji kredytodawca-kredytobiorca. Celem artykułu jest przegląd badań teoretycznych z zakresu umowy kredytowej. (fragment tekstu)

EN

The article reviews theoretical studies on the loan agreement. First, the results of researches in the area of the costly state verification models proving optimality of the standard debt contract in conditions of information asymmetry and existence of costs of verification of the debtor's outcomes were analysed. Followed by analysis of the models included in the mainstream of the incomplete contract theory, which assume unpredictability of nature and the need to take into account the role of collateral and the liquidation value on the loan repayment. The focus was also placed on researches taking into account the impact of debt renegotiation and long lender-borrower relationship on the behaviour of the borrower during the repayment of the debt. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Umowa kredytowa; Negocjacje; Zadłużenie

EN

Credit agreement; Negotiations; Indebtedness

• Czasopismo: Kwartalnik Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społecznego Studia i Prace / Szkoła Główna Handlowa
• Rocznik: 2015
• Numer: nr 3, t. 2 Bankowość. Bankowość komercyjna i spółdzielcza
• Strony: 113--125

Twórcy

autor

Andrzej Paliński

• AGH Akademia Górniczo-Hutnicza im. Stanisława Staszica w Krakowie

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

https://doi.org/10.33119/KKESSiP.2015.2.3.8