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2015 | nr 406 Globalizacja - gra z dodatnim czy ujemnym wynikiem? | 369--381
Tytuł artykułu

Koszty restrukturyzacji zadłużenia zagranicznego państwa

Autorzy
Warianty tytułu
The Costs of Sovereign Debt Restructurings
Języki publikacji
PL
Abstrakty
Teoria zakłada, że zawieszenie spłaty zadłużenia zagranicznego przez państwo może być kosztowne. Aby uniknąć tych kosztów, kraje na ogół spłacają swoje długi. Autorka stawia pytanie: czy i w jakim zakresie doświadczenia empiryczne potwierdzają założenia teorii, i próbuje na nie odpowiedzieć, dokonując przeglądu bogatej literatury ekonomicznej poświęconej zadłużeniu państwa, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem najnowszych opracowań empirycznych. Autorka dochodzi do wniosku, że doświadczenia empiryczne w niewielkim stopniu potwierdzają założenia i przewidywania modeli teoretycznych o istnieniu zewnętrznych kosztów zawieszenia spłaty długu w postaci bezpośrednich sankcji wierzycieli lub wykluczenia dłużnika z międzynarodowych rynków kapitałowych, natomiast potwierdzają istnienie kosztów wewnętrznych ponoszonych przez gospodarkę i podmioty prywatne kraju dłużnika.(abstrakt oryginalny)
EN
Theory implies that sovereign defaults can be costly and therefore states usually repay their debts.The paper focuses especially on answering the question: Is the empirical evidence on sovereign defaults consistent with the predictions and assumptions of the theoretical literature? Or do we have to change our views based on the new empirical works? The paper surveys the economic literature on sovereign defaults and restructurings with a focus on the new empirical contributions. The paper finds limited support for theorical explanations that sovereign defaults lead to external sanctions or exclusion from the international capital market and for more support for explanations that emphasize domestic costs of default.(original abstract)
Twórcy
  • Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie
Bibliografia
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Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171398439

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