Przyczyny ustanawiania i stabilność konstytucji państwa - perspektywa ekonomiczna

• Autorzy: Jan Fałkowski , Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska

Warianty tytułu

Countries' constitutions viewed from an economic perspective: why they are enacted and how stable they are

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Artykuł ma na celu wskazanie najważniejszych wątków z powstałej na przestrzeni ostatnich lat literatury wyjaśniającej powody ustanawiania konstytucji, ich trwania i zmian oraz powiązanie tych rozważań z zagadnieniami dotyczącymi wpływu konstytucji na gospodarkę. Zaprezentowana dyskusja czerpie przede wszystkim z osiągnięć ekonomii konstytucyjnej, nowej ekonomii politycznej i ekonomicznej analizy prawa, sięgając m.in. do wytłumaczeń nawiązujących do teorii praw własności, teorii grup interesu, czy analiz rozkładu siły politycznej pomiędzy różne grupy w społeczeństwie. Przedstawione rozważania pozwalają zidentyfikować podstawowe czynniki kształtujące proces ustanawiania reguł konstytucyjnych oraz ich trwałość, naświetlając jednocześnie cztery kanały, poprzez które konstytucja może wpływać na gospodarkę. W tym kontekście, uwaga koncentruje się na (1) znaczeniu, jakie konstytucja ma dla wzmacniania wiarygodności obietnic składanych przez elity polityczne; (2) na roli jaką odgrywa ona przy zwiększaniu stabilności politycznej w państwie; (3) na działalności grup interesu czerpiących wymierne korzyści z konkretnych zapisów konstytucyjnych; oraz (4) na kosztach transakcyjnych, które różni aktorzy społeczni ponoszą, czy to z konieczności dostosowania się do obowiązujących reguł czy też z chęci ich obejścia. Sformułowane w artykule wnioski mogą stanowić podstawę do dalszych badań poświęconych, np. potencjalnej substytucyjności bądź komplementarności pomiędzy niektórymi regułami konstytucyjnymi, jak i tych koncentrujących się na problemie endogenizacji konstytucji. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

Based on recent literature on the subject, the article investigates why countries need constitutions and how constitutions influence economies. The authors look at how lasting national constitutions are and why they are amended. The analysis is based on approaches including Constitutional Economics, New Political Economy, and Law and Economics. The authors reach for explanations related to property rights economics, interest group theory, and analysis of the distribution of political power between various groups of society. The study identifies the primary factors shaping the process of establishing constitutional rules and their stability. It also highlights four channels through which constitutions influence economies. In particular, the authors focus on: (1) the constitution's role in enhancing the credible commitments of political elites, (2) its significance for political stability within the state, (3) the functioning of interest groups benefiting from various constitutional provisions, and (4) transaction costs that various actors bear because of the necessity to adjust to the enforced rules or attempts to evade them. The authors formulate conclusions that they say could contribute to further research on the potential substitutability and complementarity of constitutional rules and to studies focusing on the issue of endogenizing constitutions. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Konstytucja; Ekonomia polityczna; Prawo gospodarcze; Instytucje ekonomiczne; Ekonomia konstytucyjna

EN

Constitution; Political economy; Economic law; Economic institutions; Constitutional economics

• Czasopismo: Gospodarka Narodowa
• Rocznik: 2015
• Numer: nr 3
• Strony: 79--105

Twórcy

autor

Jan Fałkowski

• Uniwersytet Warszawski

autor

Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska

• Uniwersytet Warszawski

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