Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
The main goal of the article is to argue for admissibility of substitution of coreferential proper names in belief contexts which generally has not been allowed in the logico-semantic tradition that dates back to the works of G.Frege. The main object of criticism is a so-called principle of disquotation, as formulated by S.Kripke, which conditions the prohibition of the aforementioned substitution and which is accepted within the Fregean tradition. Some related issues associated with the works of R.Carnap, W.V.O.Quine, and N.Salmon are addressed.(original abstract)
Twórcy
autor
- Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
Bibliografia
- 1. Frege, G. On Sense and Reference, [in:] Peter Geach and Max Black (eds.) Philosophical of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Blackwell, 1952.
- 2. Russell, B. The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, The Monist 28: 495-527; 29: 32-63, 190-222, 345- 80.
- 3. Quine, W.V. Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes, Journal of Philosophy 53, 1956.
- 4. Carnap, R. Meaning and Necessity. A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947.
- 5. Kripke, Saul. A Puzzle About Belief, [in:] Peter Ludlow (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Language. MIT, 1997, pp. 875-920. (Originally published in Margalit, Avishai (ed.) Meaning and Use. Dodrecht: Reidel, 1979).
- 6. Salmon, Nathan. Frege's Puzzle. Cambridge: MIT Press. 1986.
- 7. Soames, Scott. Reference and Description: the Case Against Two-Dimensionalism. Princeton, 2005.
- 8. Kaplan, D. Quantifying, Synthese 19 (1968-1969): 178-214.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171420626