An Experimental Analysis of Price Formation on the Polish Power Exchange

• Autorzy: Ewa Drabik
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The Polish energy market gained its competitive character in late 1990s. At that time in majority of European countries a new law was enacted (in Poland - in 1987), which enabled the creation of internal energy markets. The Polish Power Exchange has been functioning since the end of 1999. However, from the very onset it has constituted a vital component of under grounding liberalization of electricity market. Since it was created the Polish Power Exchange has served as a market mechanism for setting objective energy market price. Support and control of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority guarantee the security of concluded transactions. The spot energy market was created as the first one and has functioned according to the rule of the double auction. The model of Sadrieh will be used for the description of the auction rules applied to the spot energy trade on the Polish Power Exchange. Furthermore, an algorithm on the basis of which it is possible to forecast transaction prices is presented. The effectiveness of this algorithm will be compared with other traditional methods of forecasting transaction prices.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Energy market; Stochastic processes; Forecasting; Energy prices; Experimental analysis

PL

Rynek energetyczny; Procesy stochastyczne; Prognozowanie; Ceny energii; Analiza eksperymentalna

• Czasopismo: Folia Oeconomica Stetinensia
• Rocznik: 2015
• Tom: 15
• Numer: nr 2
• Strony: 115--127

Twórcy

autor

Ewa Drabik

• Warsaw University of Technology, Poland

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.1515/foli-2015-0039