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2016 | nr 428 Wrocław Conference in Finance: Contemporary Trends and Challenges | 236--250
Tytuł artykułu

The Role of The ECB'S QE In Alleviating The Eurozone Debt Crisis

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Warianty tytułu
Rola QE EBC w łagodzeniu kryzysu zadłużeniowego w strefie euro
Języki publikacji
In the wake of the Great Recession that begun in 2007, several central banks became trapped in the zero lower bound. The Federal Reserve Bank, the Bank of England, and the European Central Bank were unable to reinvigorate bank lending despite slashing their interest rates to a zero level. The Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of England adopted their QE programs just after the collapse of Lehman Brothers to alleviate balance sheet recessions by facilitating economic recovery which in turn gradually unlocked credit and money creation. The decision to launch the ECB's QE was significantly delayed which pushed the Eurozone into a double-dip recession. Despite being long overdue the ECB's QE led to a number of favourable outcomes. One of these was a reduction in public debt service as QE programs are tools which facilitate government debt restructuring through de facto conversion of the treasuries purchased by the central bank into zero-coupon perpetuities(original abstract)
W czasie Wielkiej Recesji, która zaczęła się w 2007 r., Bank Rezerwy Federalnej, Bank Anglii i Europejski Bank Centralny napotkały barierę niemożności ożywienia koniunktury pomimo obniżenia stóp procentowych do zera. Rezerwa Federalna i Bank Anglii zdecydowały się rozpocząć programy ilościowego łagodzenia polityki pieniężnej od razu po upadku banku Lehman Brothers, by wywołać dzięki temu ożywienie gospodarcze, które odblokowuje popyt na kredyt i umożliwia wzrost podaży pieniądza. Decyzja o rozpoczęciu programu QE przez EBC została podjęta z dużym opóźnieniem, co spowodowało w strefie euro powrót recesji. Mimo to rozpoczęcie przez ECB programu QE przyniosło szereg korzyści. Najważniejszą była możliwość efektywnej redukcji długu publicznego, ponieważ QE prowadzi de facto do zamiany kupionych przez bank centralny obligacji skarbowych na zerokuponowe konsole(abstrakt oryginalny)
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