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2016 | t. 17, z. 1, cz. 2 Management - Human Resources Management - Knowledge Management : Research and Analysis | 57--66
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Managerial Succession and Corporate Effectiveness : Review of Research Trends

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The main goal of this article is to analyze stocks price reaction and company`s performance to changes in management authorities. Analysis of major international and Polish trends have been discussed. Depending on the location we may observe diversities in management policy and the different political commitment of managers. As things are, the rotation of managerial positions is not directly related to the economic situation of the company. In addition, supervisory board`s role is significantly different. It could control or only advise the managers. The biggest influence on stocks prices or effectiveness of the company has the management board dismiss reason. We cannot observe reactions in share prices if the management board tenure is ending or its voluntarily dismiss. However, in the event of the forced dismiss the share price reaction depends on the company situation. The shares rise or fall, if it was a surprise. It is important to stress that we can find a number of gaps in conducted research. The research related to demographic, cultural or religious characteristics versus company`s management efficiency are insufficient. (original abstract)
  • University of Lodz
  • University of Lodz
  • University of Lodz
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