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2016 | vol. 14, nr 2 (60), t. 2 Methods of Survey Analysis in Management | 117--133
Tytuł artykułu

Board Homophily, Board Diversity and Network Centrality

Warianty tytułu
Homofilia, zróżnicowanie i centralność rady w sieci
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
The relationships of multiple firms linked by interlocking directors are among classic subjects of studies within the social network approach in organizational research. Interlocking directorates enable exchange of information and resources between two or more firms that are linked by a director who participates in their boards. The phenomenon of interlocking directorates is a major area of research in management, sociology and political science, and has been investigated across different countries, cultures and governance systems. We present a study of interlocking directorates linking boards of firms that are listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The main aim of this paper is to investigate if board diversity and board homophily are related to positions in an interlocking directorates network. We apply methods of social network analysis. (original abstract)
Relacje firm powiązanych przez dyrektorów zasiadających w wielu radach należą do klasycznych obszarów badań nurtu sieciowego w domenie nauk organizacji i zarządzania. Powiązania rad umożliwiają wymianę informacji i zasobów między dwoma lub więcej firmami powiązanymi ze względu na występowanie w ich organach zarządzających i/lub kontrolnych tych samych osób. Fenomen powiązań rad firm jest przedmiotem wielu badań w naukach o zarządzaniu, socjologii i naukach politycznych realizowanych w różnych krajach, kulturach o odmiennych systemach ładu korporacyjnego. Przedstawiamy w artykule badanie powiązań rad firm notowanych na warszawskiej Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych. Głównym celem prezentowanych badań jest przedstawienie zależności między zróżnicowaniem składu rady, zjawiskiem hemofilii rad a centralnością ich pozycji w sieci relacji międzyorganizacyjnych tworzonych przez powiązania rad. W artykule wykorzystano metody analiz sieci społecznych. (abstrakt oryginalny)
Twórcy
  • University of Warsaw
  • University of Warsaw
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