Patent Policy in an Innovation Driven Economy: Schumpeter's "Innovation Wave" Perspective

• Autorzy: Karol Śledzik

Warianty tytułu

Polityka patentowa w gospodarce opartej na innowacyjności: perspektywa schumpeterowskiej fali innowacji

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Cel - W artykule wykorzystano Schumpeterowską teorię innowacji w odniesieniu do współczesnej polityki patentowej. Przeprowadzona analiza teoretyczna kształtu współczesnej polityki patentowej uwzględniała zagadnienia dotyczące możliwości rozwoju lub ograniczania rozwoju gospodarki opartej na innowacyjności. Celem artykułu była odpowiedź na pytanie: Czy współczesna polityka patentowa ma konstruktywny czy destruktywny wpływ na gospodarkę oparta na innowacyjności? Metodyka badania - Autor opracowania dokonał przeglądu literatury przedmiotu oraz zaproponował koncepcję "Krzywej Fali Patentowej". Wynik - W części pierwszej artykułu przeanalizowano role polityki patentowej w gospodarce z uwzględnieniem działalności negatywnej pewnej grupy przedsiębiorstw. W drugiej części opierając się na teorii innowacyjności J.A. Schumpetera oraz teorii "wyścigów patentowych" uwzględniono w rozważaniach drastyczny wzrost aplikacji do urzędów patentowych. Sugestią autora artykułu jest aby podczas debat ekonomicznych dotyczących polityki patentowej zmienić punkt nacisku z eliminacji niepożądanych w gospodarce podmiotów na eliminację destruktywnych zachowań systemowych. Oryginalność/wartość - W artykule autor zaprezentował koncepcję "Krzywej Fali Patentowej". Koncepcja oparta jest o założenia "kreatywnej destrukcji" Schumpetera oraz teorii "wyścigów patentowych". Koncepcja ma o tyle istotne znaczenie ponieważ nasiliła się ostatnimi czasy działalność spółek typu NPE oraz PAE wraz ze zintensyfikowaną działalnością w ramach aplikacji do urzędów patentowych. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

Purpose - At times of high competitiveness Purpose - This paper applies Schumpeter's innovation theory approach to current patent policy. The theoretical analysis examines whether the patent policy harms the innovation level in the innovation driven economy. The aim of this paper is to answer the question: Is current patent policy stimulating or does it have a destructive impact on economic development driven by innovations? Design/methodology/approach - In this paper there is a discussion of how patent policy can influence the innovation level in an Innovation Driven Economy. The author has focused on a literature study and has presented a theoretical concept of the "Patent Wave Curve". Findings - Part I of this paper discusses the role of patent policy in the economy and highlights policy concerns raised by the actions of certain entities. Part II concludes with a brief overview of Schumpeter's innovation wave concept in the conditions of increased amounts of patent applications. The author therefore suggests that the economic and patent policy debate should change its attention toward finding significant ways of identifying innovation destructive behaviours, instead of eliminating certain business models. Originality/value - With reference to Schumpeter's innovation theory the author presented in a paper the "Patent Wave Curve" concept. Having regard to Schumpeter's creative destruction, patent racing theory, the current number of patent applications and patent policy problems (such as NPEs or PAEs activity) there is a point in the economy when without proper impulse it is pushed into an "innovation stagnation trap". (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Patenty; Prawo patentowe; Innowacje; Gospodarka

EN

Patent; Patent law; Innovations; Economy

• Czasopismo: Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia
• Rocznik: 2016
• Numer: nr 1 (79) Rynek kapitałowy i zarządzanie wartością
• Strony: 327--338

Twórcy

autor

Karol Śledzik

• University of Gdansk, Poland

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.18276/frfu.2016.79-25