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2016 | 9 | nr 3 | 114--123
Tytuł artykułu

Mancur Olson's Collective Action Theory 50 Years Later : a View from the Institutionalist Perspective

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Treść / Zawartość
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
This essay is a tribute paid to one of the most distinguished landmarks in social theory - Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action, which has recently turned 50 years old. We look at it as a specific stage in the debate that takes place in social sciences. In 1965 it was path-breaking due to the use of economic reasoning applied to social phenomena, but today the very same method of analysis is being challenged by institutionalist thought. This is, however, the way that social sciences evolve and Olson's theory is no exception. The very assumptions employed by Olson are being questioned nowadays with respect to their compliance with reality and proper depiction of incentives that drive human behaviour. Nonetheless, it still remains a milestone in the process of recognizing the mechanisms governing collective actions. (original abstract)
Rocznik
Tom
9
Numer
Strony
114--123
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
  • University of Economics in Katowice, Poland
Bibliografia
  • Bollier, D., Helfrich, S. eds. (2012), Wealth of the Commons. A World Beyond Market and State, Amherst: Levellers Press.
  • Chmielewski, P. (2011), Homo agens. Instytucjonalizm w naukach społecznych, Warszawa: Poltext.
  • Colander, D. (2008), Macroeconomic Policy and Collective Action, Middlebury College Economics Discussion Paper No. 03-32.
  • de Moor, T., Laborda-Peman, M., Lana-Berasain, J.M., van Weeren, R., Winchester, A. (2016), Ruling the Commons. Introducing a New Methodology for the Analysis of Historical Commons, International Journal of the Commons, Vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 529-588.
  • Dixit, A. (1999), Mancur Olson - Social Scientist, The Economic Journal, Vol. 109, no. 456, pp. 443-452.
  • Douglas, M. (2012 [1986]), How Institutions Think, London: Routledge.
  • Granovetter, M. (1985), Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 481-510.
  • Galbraith, J.K. (2012 [1952]), American Capitalism. The Concept of Countervailing Power, Eastford: Martino Fine Books.
  • Grodzicki, M. (2015), Dlaczego grupom udaje się podejmować działania? Przedstawienie teorii działań zbiorowych Elinor Ostrom, Ekonomia społeczna, no. 1, pp. 66-78.
  • Kirdina, S. (2003), Institutional Matrices and Institutional Changes. Munich Personal RePEc Archive, http://mpra.ub.uni- muenchen.de/29691/, (referred on 13.03.2016).
  • Kirdina, S. (2015), Methodological Individualism and Methodological Institutionalism for Interdisciplinary Research, Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 53-67.
  • Mayhew, A. (1989), Contrasting Origins of the Two Institutionalisms: The Social Science Context, Review of Political Economy, Vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 319-333.
  • Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  • Olson, M. (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations. Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
  • Ostrom, E. (1998), A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, no. 1, pp. 1-22.
  • Ostrom, E. (2000), Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 137-158.
  • Ostrom, E. (2010), Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, American Economic Review, Vol. 100, no. 3, pp. 641-672.
  • Reuben, E. (2003), The Evolution of Theories of Collective Action, Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
  • Rowe, J. (2013), Our Common Wealth. The Hidden Economy that Makes Everything Else Work, Oakland: Berrett-Koehler.
  • Talmud, I. (2013), Economic Sociology, Sociopedia.isa, http://www.isa-sociology.org (referred on 15.04.2016).
  • Trumbull, G. (2012), Strength in Numbers. The Political Power of Weak Interests, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171451243

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