CEO Duality, State Shareholder and CEO Turnover: Evidence from Vietnamese Stock Market

• Autorzy: Quoc Trung Tran , Xuan Minh Nguyen , Tien Hoang Nguyen
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The extant literature shows that the effects of CEO duality and state shareholder on the sensitivity of management turnover to firm performance are mixed. Using a sample of 1,260 firm-year observations from 226 firms listed in Vietnam from 2009 to 2015, we find supporting evidence for manager turnover mechanism. Interestingly, research results show that the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover is weaker when CEOs simultaneously holds chairman positions. These findings imply that the separation of CEO and chairman positions is necessary to enhance corporate governance. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Stock market companies; Shareholders; Corporate governance

PL

Spółki giełdowe; Akcjonariusz; Ład korporacyjny

• Czasopismo: Business and Economic Horizons
• Rocznik: 2016
• Numer: vol. 12, iss. 3
• Strony: 113--120

Twórcy

autor

Quoc Trung Tran

• Foreign Trade University, Vietnam

autor

Xuan Minh Nguyen

• Foreign Trade University, Vietnam

autor

Tien Hoang Nguyen

• Foreign Trade University, Vietnam

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.15208/beh.2016.09