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2016 | nr 6 | 95--114
Tytuł artykułu

Czy konkurencja determinuje wielkość inwestycji gmin miejskich w Polsce?

Treść / Zawartość
Warianty tytułu
Does competition affect local public investment in polish cities?
Języki publikacji
Celem artykułu jest identyfikacja determinant inwestycji, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem zmiennych dotyczących poziomu konkurencji politycznej oraz zmiennych mierzących samodzielność dochodową samorządów, która traktowana jest jako przybliżenie siły konkurencji pomiędzy ośrodkami lokalnymi, na podstawie danych z 304 gmin miejskich w Polsce z lat 2002-2014. W badaniu udowodniono istotną ujemną zależność między inwestycjami per capita (udział inwestycji w wydatkach ogółem) i poziomem politycznej konkurencji mierzonej indeksem Herfindahla-Hirschmann (HHI). Wzrost politycznej koncentracji (czyli mniejsza konkurencja) sprzyjał wzrostowi inwestycji publicznych na mieszkańca. Ponadto wykazano, że inwestycje są zależne od poziomu decentralizacji fiskalnej. Wyniki sugerują, że wzrost decentralizacji zwiększa udział środków publicznych przeznaczonych na inwestycje. (abstrakt oryginalny)
In this paper, we study the influence of political and local competition on public investment expenditures. Using panel data for 304 Polish cities over the 2002-2014 period, we estimate the determinants of public infrastructure investment. The estimations show that both political competition and fiscal decentralization matter for public investment spending. A significant negative correlation was found between investment per capita (the proportion of investment in total expenditure) and the level of political competition measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). A decrease in the intensity of competition results in greater public investment per capita, while fiscal decentralization increases the share of public funds allocated for investment. (original abstract)
Opis fizyczny
  • Uniwersytet Warszawski
  • Uniwersytet Warszawski
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