Innovation and New Forms of Economic Governance

• Autorzy: Krzysztof Waśniewski
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The purpose of the paper is to study the connection between technological progress on the one hand, and systems of economic governance, on the other hand. A simple model of economic governance is introduced, deriving the functional capacity of social structures to carry out technological progress from their capacity to appropriate capital. That capacity is grounded both in efficiency and legitimation. That broad theoretical frame is applied to the coexistence of constitutional states and other forms of economic governance. Empirical evidence indicates that constitutional states are losing their capacity to appropriate capital. Additional, contextual evidence suggests two other patterns of social change. On the one hand, demographic growth is slowing down. On the other hand, absorption of innovation in the global economy, back in the past strongly correlated with the fiscal intervention of governments, presently seems to have disconnected from the economic power of constitutional states. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Innovations; Technological progress; Social change; Economic system

PL

Innowacje; Postęp technologiczny; Przemiany społeczne; System gospodarczy

• Czasopismo: Forum Scientiae Oeconomia
• Rocznik: 2016
• Tom: 4
• Numer: nr 3 Innovations, Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth
• Strony: 55--65

Twórcy

autor

Krzysztof Waśniewski

• Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University

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