Unstash the Cash! Corporate Governance Reform in Japan

• Autorzy: Chie Aoyagi , Giovanni Ganelli
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Japan's high corporate savings might be holding back growth, by preventing a more efficient use of resources. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been the main contributors to high corporate cash balances, but more recently larger companies have also increased cash holdings. This paper focuses on the causes and consequences of the current corporate behavior and suggests options for reform. In particular, Japan's weak corporate governance - as measured by available indexes - might be contributing to high cash holdings. An empirical analysis on a panel of Japanese firms confirms that improving corporate governance would help unlock corporate savings. The main policy implication of the analysis carried out in this paper is that a more ambitious and comprehensive corporate governance reform should be a key component of Japan's growth strategy. Such a reform would help remove some of the bottlenecks of the legal and corporate governance. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Corporate governance; Economic growth; Enterprise savings

PL

Ład korporacyjny; Wzrost gospodarczy; Oszczędności przedsiębiorstwa

• Czasopismo: Journal of Banking and Financial Economics
• Rocznik: 2017
• Numer: nr 1(7)
• Strony: 51--69

Twórcy

autor

Chie Aoyagi

• International Monetary Fund, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Japan

autor

Giovanni Ganelli

• International Monetary Fund, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Japan

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.7172/2353-6845.jbfe.2017.1.3