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2017 | 10 | nr 1 | 122--134
Tytuł artykułu

Reasons for Doing Good : Behavioural Explanations of Prosociality in Economics

Treść / Zawartość
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
This paper discusses issues of altruism and prosocial behaviour within economics. The first part discusses relations between understanding of expected utility theory and features of an economic man. It also defines the most important properties of the game and provides some simple solutions. The second part includes a critical overview of selected and increasingly complex concepts explaining the phenomenon of prosocial behaviour. It begins with models focusing only on final allocations and ends with those studying the role of intentions, motivations and social status of agents. It also shows how needs, social conditions, norms and individual characteristics affect the propensity to behave prosocially. (original abstract)
Rocznik
Tom
10
Numer
Strony
122--134
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
  • Cracow University of Economics, Poland
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Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
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Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171470323

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