The Special Aspects of Venture Capital's Value Creating Mechanisms in Hungary

• Autorzy: Patricia Becsky-Nagy
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The current article focuses on the special aspects of venture capital's value creation methods, summarizing the author's researches in this field. This article puts special emphasis on the scrutiny of the Hungarian market as the value creation practices on the domestic market have not been revealed thoroughly in the literature yet. The article attempts to examine the performance of venture capital, especially the JEREMIE funds, according to the limited available secondary data of the companies involved, which helps to assess the role of the government in bridging the financial gap and solving the problems in the venture capital market in Hungary. In this field reliable statistical data is not available, but there is an ongoing primer research led by the author, producing new information soon. The article presents the special investment and value creating methods of venture capitalists. In the first part of the article the theoretical background is presented, and in the second part of the article the author's research results are demonstrated following the same order. Keywords: venture capital, value creation, governmental role. (original abstract)

Artykuł stanowi podsumowanie obszernych badań autorki i skupia się na metodach kreowania wartości przez fundusze venture capital. Rozpoczyna się przeglądem literatury, w którym opisano podstawy teoretyczne kreowania wartości. W drugiej części artykułu przedstawiono badania empiryczne na rynku węgierskim, dla którego praktyki inwestorów w zakresie kreowania wartości nie zostały dostatecznie opisane w literaturze przedmiotu. W związku z tym, że w krajach europejskich państwo jest obecnie jednym z największych inwestorów w fundusze VC wspierającym projekty we wczesnej fazie rozwoju, w artykule zwrócono szczególną uwagę na rolę państwa na rynku VC. W tym kontekście wybór rynku węgierskiego jest uzasadniony, z tego względu, że rząd tego kraju dysponował największą pulą środków w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej pochodzącą z Inicjatywy JEREMIE, którą ulokował w funduszach hybrydowych podwyższonego ryzyka. Wnioski z zaprezentowanych badań są następujące: podczas gdy wsparte przez rząd fundusze VC wywierają efekt stymulujący na rozwój rynku VC, to wycofanie się państwa w długim okresie z aktywnego zaangażowania i przyjęcie pasywnej postawy może być bardziej skuteczne w pobudzaniu efektywności rynku VC. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Venture capital; States' role in economy; Venture capital funds; Value creation; Joint European Resources for Micro and Idiom Enterprises (JEREMIE)

PL

Venture capital; Rola państwa w gospodarce; Fundusze venture capital; Tworzenie wartości; Inicjatywa JEREMIE

• Czasopismo: Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Innovation (JEMI)
• Rocznik: 2016
• Tom: 12
• Numer: nr 3 Innovation In Finance
• Strony: 31--55

Twórcy

autor

Patricia Becsky-Nagy

• University of Debrecen, Hungary

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.7341/20161232