Polityka makroostrożnościowa i bank centralny - małżeństwo z rozsądku?

• Autorzy: Anna Matysek-Jędrych

Warianty tytułu

Macroprudential Policies and the Central Bank - a Marriage of Convenience?

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Globalny kryzys finansowy wymusił redefinicję rozwiązań instytucjonalnych sieci bezpieczeństwa finansowego. Jedną z najszybciej wprowadzanych zmian jest korekta optyki nadzorczej z mikro na makroostrożnościową i uznanie banku centralnego za instytucję właściwą dla sprawowania tego nadzoru. Głównym celem artykułu jest analiza i ocena kwestii lokalizacji kompetencji w zakresie polityki makroostrożnościowej w banku centralnym. Cel ten realizowano na dwóch płaszczyznach. Po pierwsze, dokonano przeglądu argumentów za i przeciw lokalizacji polityki makroostrożnościowej w banku centralnym na gruncie teorii. Po drugie, dokonano prezentacji danych empirycznych o charakterze jakościowym, w których z identyfikowano dominujące w krajach wysoko rozwiniętych rozwiązania instytucjonalne w odniesieniu do kompetencji nadzorczych w wymiarze makroostrożnościowym.(abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

The Global financial crisis caused a redefinition of the institutional arrangements of the financial safety net. One of the most popular changes was the correction of financial supervision optics, from microprudential to macroprudential and the selection of the central bank as a proper institution to perform the role of a systemic financial supervisor. The main objective of this article is to analyze and critically assess the central bank's competences over macroprudential policies. This study was carried out in two aspects. Firstly, theoretical considerations showing pros and cons were analyzed. Secondly, the results of empirical qualitative research were presented. The main aim of that research was to identify tendencies in highly-developed countries in relation to the location and character of macroprudential policy competences.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Banki centralne; Polityka ostrożnościowa; Stabilność finansowa; Bezpieczeństwo finansowe; Ryzyko systemowe; Sieć bezpieczeństwa finansowego; Polityka makroostrożnościowa

EN

Central banks; Prudential policy; Financial sustainability; Financial security; Systemic risk; Financial safety net; Macroprudential policy

• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego w Zielonej Górze
• Rocznik: 2017
• Numer: nr 7
• Strony: 212--223

Twórcy

autor

Anna Matysek-Jędrych

• Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu

Bibliografia

• Bańbuła P. (2013), Polityka makroostrożnościowa: przesłanki, cele, instrumenty i wyzwania, "Materiały i Studia", nr 298, Narodowy Bank Polski, Warszawa.
• Barro R.J., Gordon D.B. (1983), A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model, "Journal of Political Economy", vol. 91, no. 4 (August), p. 589-610.
• Beau D., Clerc L., Mojon B. (2012), Macro-Prudential Policy and the Conduct of Monetary Policy, "Banque de France Working Paper", no. 390.
• Blinder A.S. (1982), Issues in the Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policy, NBER Working Paper, no. 982, September.
• Borio C. (2003), Towards a macro prudential framework for financial supervision and regulation, BIS Working Papers, no. 128, Bank for International Settlement, Basel.
• Borio C. (2010), Implementing a macroprudential framework: Blending boldness and realism, Bank for International Settlements, Basel.
• Borio C. (2011), Central banking post-crisis: What compass for unchartered waters? Bank for International Settlements, Basel.
• Brzoza-Brzezina M., Kolasa M., Makarski K.(2013), Macroprudential policy and imbalances in euro area, "NBP Working Paper", no. 138, National Bank of Poland, Warsaw.
• Calvo G.A. (1978), On the time consistency of optimal policy in the monetary economy, "Econometrica", vol. 46, no. 6, p. 1411-1428.
• Caruana J. (2010), The challenges of taking macroprudential decisions: who will press which button(s)? 13th Annual International banking Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, 24 September.
• Cerutti E., Claessens S., Laeven L. (2015), The use and effectiveness of macroprudential policies: New evidence, "IMF Working Paper", no. 61, International Monetary Fund, Washington.
• Crockett A. (1997), The theory and practice of financial stability, GEI Newsletter, no. 6.
• Dobrzańska A. (2016), Polityka makroostrożnościowa banku centralnego, Difin, Warszawa.
• Dunstan A. (2014), The interaction between monetary and macro-prudential policy, "Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin", vol. 77, no. 2.
• Eichengreen B., El-Erian M., Fraga A., Pisani-Ferry J., Prasad E., Rajan R., Ramos M., Reinhart C., Rey H., Rodrik D., Rogoff K. (2011), Rethinking Central Banking, Report of the Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform.
• Eusepi S., Preston B. (2007), Central bank communication and expectations stabilization, NBER Working Paper 13259 (July).
• Evans O., Leone A.M., Gill M., Hilbers P. (2000), Macroprudential indicators of financial system soundness, IMF Occasional Paper, no. 192, International Monetary Fund, Washington.
• Ferguson R.W. (2003), Should financial stability be an explicit central bank objective? w: Ugolini P.C., Schaechter A., Stone S.R. (red.), Challenges to Central Banking from Globalized Financial Systems, International Monetary Fund, Washington.
• Financial Stability Board (2011), Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks, Progress Report to G20, International Monetary Funds, Bank for International Settlements, 27 October, http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/102711.pdf.
• Giese J., Nelson B., Tanaka M., Tarashev N. (2013), How could macroprudential policy affect financial system resilience and credit? Lessons from the literature, "Financial Stability Paper", no. 21, May, Bank of England.
• González-Páramo J. (2007), Expectations and credibility in modern central banking: a practitioner's view', speech at the Conference on "Inflation targeting, central bank independence and transparency", University of Cambridge, Cambridge.
• Group of Thirty (2010), Enhancing Financial Stability and Resilience. Macroprudential Policy, Tools, and Systems for the Future, Group of Thirty, Washington.
• IMF (2013), Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy, "International Monetary Fund", June10, Washington.
• Issing O. (2016), Central banks: from overburdening to decline?, "White Paper Series", no. 42.
• Karkowska R. (2015), Ryzyko systemowe - charakter i źródła indywidualizacji w sektorze bankowym, Oficyna Wolters Kluwer Business, Warszawa.
• Kydland F., Prescott E. (1977), Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of optimal plans, "Journal of Political Economy", vol. 85, no. 3, p. 473-492.
• Maddaloni A., Peydró J.-L. (2013), Monetary Policy, macroprudential Policy and banking stability. Evidence from the Euro Area, "ECB Working Paper Series", no. 1560, July.
• Masciandaro D., VolpicellaA. (2016), Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers, "Journal of International Money and Finance", vol. 61, March, p. 101-119.
• Nash J. (1950), Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games, "Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America", vol. 36, no. 1, p. 48-49.
• Nier E.W., Osinski J., Jácome L.I., Madrid P. (2011), Towards effective macroprudential policy frameworks: An assessment of stylized institutional models, "IMF Working Papers", no. 250, International Monetary Fund, Washington.
• Olszak M. (2012), Polityka ostrożnościowa w ujęciu makro - cel, instrumenty i architektura instytucjonalna, "Problemy Zarządzania", vol. 10, nr 4 (39), Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warszawa.
• Padoa-Schioppa T. (2003), Central banks and financial stability: exploring a land in between, w: Gaspar V., Hartman P., Sleijpen O. (red.), The transformation of the European financial system, Second ECB Central Banking Conference, European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main.
• Schinasi G.J (2004), Defining Financial Stability, "IMF Working Paper", no. 187, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
• Sławiński A., Chmielewski T. (2010), Wykorzystanie instrumentów nadzorczych w polityce makrostabilnościowej, "Zarządzanie Publiczne", vol. 13, nr 3, s. 49-66.
• Smaga P. (2014), Istota ryzyka systemowego, "Studia Ekonomiczne", INE PAN, nr 1 (LXXX), Warszawa.
• Smets F. (2014), Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: How Closely Interlinked? "International Journal of Central Banking", vol. 10, no. 2, June, p. 263-300.
• Svensson L.E.O. (2015), Monetary Policy and Macrorpudential Policy: Different and Separate, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 57th Economic Conference, October 2-3.
• Szpunar P.J. (2012), Rola polityki makroostrożnościowej w zapobieganiu kryzysom finansowym, "Materiały i Studia", nr 278, Narodowy Bank Polski, Warszawa.
• Ueda K., Valencia F. (2012), Central Bank Independence and Macro-prudential Regulation, "IMF Working Paper", no. 12/101, International Monetary Fund, Washington.