Monopolization through Acqusition

• Autorzy: Jacek Prokop
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The author examines the possibility of monopolization in a sector dominated by three enterprises through the purchase of rival businesses - assuming there are no limitations imposed by the antimonopoly office. The analysis involved two monopolization models: static and dynamic, assuming that a single buyer will seek to monopolize the sector. Unlike in other models described in literature to date, the author assumes that the owners of companies subject to acquisition use mixed strategies in their decisions on selling their enterprises. In the static model, the author says, monopolization through acquisition may prove to be profitable. However, a dynamic analysis of the issue shows that the expected profit may be much smaller than suggested by static analyses and may fail to cover the permanent costs linked with the process of acquisition. Moreover, the probability of selling an enterprise by its owner is close to zero, which puts a question mark over the possibility of conducting effective monopolization through acquisition. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Monopolistic markets; Company buyout; Market games; Corporate acquisitions; Market equilibrium

PL

Rynki monopolistyczne; Wykup przedsiębiorstwa; Gry rynkowe; Przejęcie przedsiębiorstwa; Równowaga rynkowa

• Czasopismo: Gospodarka Narodowa
• Rocznik: 2006
• Numer: nr Special Issue
• Strony: 163--176

Twórcy

autor

Jacek Prokop

• Warsaw School of Economics, Poland

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