Countering Terrorism: Deterrence vs More Effective Alternatives

• Autorzy: Bruno S. Frey
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The prevailing response to terrorist attacks has been coercive military counter-terrorism. This holds, in particular, for today's major world power, the United States, but also for nations such as Britain and Israel. Deterrence does not necessarily use brute force (Schelling, 1966; Byman and Waxman, 2002); it also involves the threat of damage to an adversary. Deterrence offers the terrorist group the possibility to desist from future violent action, but if the terrorists respond by increased actions, they impose costs on the country using deterrence. Deterrence is only credible if it is sometimes used. Indeed, the idea of a deterrent strategy is to impose such high cost on terrorists that the expected value of pursuing their course is disadvantageous to them.(fragment of text)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Terrorism; Combating terrorism

PL

Terroryzm; Zwalczanie terroryzmu

• Czasopismo: Open Economics
• Rocznik: 2018
• Numer: vol. 1, iss. 1
• Strony: 30--35

Twórcy

autor

Bruno S. Frey

• University of Basel, Zurich, Switzerland ; CREMA - Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Zurich, Switzerland

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

DOI 10.1515/openec-2017-0002