Enterprise Efficiency Performance in the Light of Management Continuity - Case Studies

• Autorzy: Radosław Pastusiak , Magdalena Jasiniak , Ewa Feder-Sempach
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Changes in key management positions in companies should result in a different style of management. A manager should communicate the knowledge, skills, backed by experience, which will translate into a new, more or less effective prospect of the company. The main objective of this article is an attempt to estimate the impact of CEO tenure on the performance of Polish listed companies: PGNiG, PKN Orlen, ENEA, ORANGE for the period 2005-2015. The results of ratio analysis for the four companies analyzed in the period before and after the change of the Chairman of Board have shown a variety of changes occurring in the studied companies. Taking account of the companies' economic condition, changes in the position of Chairman of the Board had a positive character. However, the reaction of the stock market stays in contrast. In three of the four cases examined there was a decline in the quotations after the change of CEO. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Managerial staff; Management under change process

PL

Kadra kierownicza; Zarządzanie w procesie zmian

• Czasopismo: Przedsiębiorczość i Zarządzanie
• Rocznik: 2017
• Numer: t. 18, z. 1, cz. 2 Organization Management Paradigms
• Strony: 125--137

Twórcy

autor

Radosław Pastusiak

• University of Lodz

autor

Magdalena Jasiniak

• University of Lodz

autor

Ewa Feder-Sempach

• University of Lodz

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