Effects of Contract and Trust on Franchisor Performance

• Autorzy: Esther Calderon-Monge , Ivan Pastor-Sanz
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The franchisor-franchisee relationship is governed by contracts and trust. This paper analyzes how formal (contracts) and relational (trust) governance mechanisms affected franchisor performance in a service sector franchise for the period 20082015. Using the SOM method in the empirical analysis, the results revealed that trust-based governance was more prominent than contractbased governance in the multi-unit franchise network and the cross-franchising network, negatively affecting franchisor performance in the multi-unit franchise network and positively affecting franchisor performance in the cross-franchising network. In contrast, contracts were more prominent than trust in single-unit franchising, negatively affecting franchisor performance. The primary practical implication is that the franchisor should prevent franchisees in the MUF network from opening new outlets in the same city and competing for the existing outlet's customers. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Franchising; Trust; Franchising contract

PL

Franchising; Zaufanie; Umowa franchisingowa

• Czasopismo: Contemporary Economics
• Rocznik: 2017
• Tom: 11
• Numer: nr 4
• Strony: 383--400

Twórcy

autor

Esther Calderon-Monge

• University of Burgos, Spain

autor

Ivan Pastor-Sanz

• University of Valladolid, Spain

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5709/ce.1897-9254.251