Preferencje help
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników
2017 | tom 23, nr 3 | 9--18
Tytuł artykułu

Application of Modified Laffer Curve in the Marriage Market using Exit Costs

Treść / Zawartość
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
The economics literature that deals with the exit costs of marriage has considered primarily the shift from mutual consent divorce to unilateral divorce and has not provided a larger, overall picture of the marriage market under various exit conditions. This paper proposes that a modified Laffer Curve macro model of marriage and divorce provides the best overall picture of the marriage market under various exit scenarios. (original abstract)
Opis fizyczny
  • Indiana University East School of Business & Economics
  • Allen, D.W., Pendakur, K., Suen, W. (2006), No-fault divorce and the compression of marriage ages, Economic Inquiry, 44 (3), pp. 547-558.
  • Bolin, K. (1994), The marriage contract and efficient rules for spousal support, International Review of Law & Economics, 14, pp. 493-502.
  • Bramlett, M.D., Radel, L.F. (2014), Adverse family experiences among children in nonparental care, 2011-2012, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 74.
  • Clark, J.R., Lee, D.R. (1997), Too safe to be safe: Some implications of short- and long-run rescue Laffer Curves, Eastern Economic Journal, 23 (2), pp. 127-137.
  • Cohen, L.R. (1998), Marriage as contract, in: P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, New York, pp. 618-623.
  • Cott, N.F. (2000), Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation, Cambridge.
  • Ellman, I.M. (2001), ʻContract thinkingʼ was Marvin's fatal flaw, Notre Dame Law Review, 76 (5), pp. 1365-1380.
  • Fergusson, D.M., Horwood, L.J., Lynskey, M.T. (1996), Childhood sexual abuse and psychiatric disorder in young adulthood: II. Psychiatric outcomes of childhood sexual abuse, Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 35 (10), pp. 1365-1374.
  • Friedberg, L. (1998), Did unilateral divorce raise divorce rates? Evidence from panel data, The American Economic Review, 88 (3), pp. 608-627.
  • Goetz, C.J., Scott, R. E. (1980), Enforcing promises: An examination of the basis of contract, The Yale Law Journal, 89 (7), pp. 1261-1322.
  • Gwartney, J.A. et al. (2015), Macroeconomics: Private and Public Choice, Stamford.
  • Harper, C.C., McLanahan, S.S. (2004), Father absence and youth incarceration, Journal of Research on Adolescence, 14 (3), pp. 369-397.
  • Kephart, W.M., Zellner, W.M. (1994), Extraordinary Groups: An Examination of Unconventional Life-Styles, New York.
  • Laffer, A.B. (2004), The Laffer Curve: Past, present, and future, Backgrounder, 1765, pp. 1-18.
  • McLanahan, S.S. (1994), The consequences of single motherhood, The American Prospect, 18, pp. 48-58.
  • Mitchell, D. (2012), The Laffer Curve Shows that Tax Increases Are a Very Bad Idea - even if They Generate More Tax Revenue. Retrieved March 1, 2014, from http://danieljmitchell.wordpress. com/.
  • Morse, J.R. (2001), Love & Economics: Why the Laissez-Faire Family Doesn't Work, Dallas.
  • Peters, H.E. (1986), Marriage and divorce: Informational constraints and private contracting, The American Economic Review, 76 (3), pp. 437-454.
  • Rasul, I. (2006), Marriage markets and divorce laws, The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 22 (1), pp. 30-69.
  • Waite, L.J., Gallagher, M. (2000), The Case for Marriage: Why Married People are Happier, Healthier, and Better Off Financially, New York.
  • Wolfers, J. (2006), Did unilateral divorce laws raise divorce rates? A reconciliation and new results, American Economic Review, 96 (5), pp. 1802-1820.
Typ dokumentu
Identyfikator YADDA

Zgłoszenie zostało wysłane

Zgłoszenie zostało wysłane

Musisz być zalogowany aby pisać komentarze.
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.