Determinants of Managerial Risk in Corporate Governance of Polish Public Companies

• Autorzy: Amadeusz Miązek , Justyna Światowiec-Szczepańska
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The article shows research perspectives in the field of strategic management on the impact of regulatory focus and remuneration on top managers' approach to risk, and consequently - on organizational risk in Polish public companies. The problem has been presented in the context of corporate governance with the supervisory board as a policy setting body for top management. This policy can be shaped by managerial remuneration based on incentives, in particular granting of stock options, however its effectiveness is limited by promotion and prevention focus of individual managers. The impact of these factors on managerial risk taking makes a promising research gap, especially for the scarce number of available empirical research on the personality of Polish top managers. The consideration is based on the premises of agency theory, upper echelons theory, and regulatory focus theory. The article is conceptual which purpose is to present a suggested research model and appropriate methodological approach in the empirical research. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Business risk; Risk in management; Corporate governance; Regulatory policy; Strategic management

PL

Ryzyko w biznesie; Ryzyko w zarządzaniu; Ład korporacyjny; Polityka regulacyjna; Zarządzanie strategiczne

• Czasopismo: Przedsiębiorczość i Zarządzanie
• Rocznik: 2018
• Numer: t. 19, z. 6, cz. 2 Konkurencyjność współczesnych przedsiębiorstw - modele, koncepcje i uwarunkowania
• Strony: 63--75

Twórcy

autor

Amadeusz Miązek

• Poznań University of Economics and Business, Poland

autor

Justyna Światowiec-Szczepańska

• Poznań University of Economics and Business, Poland

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