Myopic Behaviour and State Involvement in a Pension System : A Cross-section Study for OECD Countries

• Autorzy: Filip Chybalski , Edyta Marcinkiewicz

Warianty tytułu

Krótkowzroczność w zachowaniach jednostek a rola państwa w systemie emerytalnym : analiza porównawcza dla krajów OECD

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The study tries to verify whether the behavioural bias called myopia actually exists in pension decisions taken by individual agents, thus justifying significant state involvement in a pension system to ensure income adequacy. The authors examine the relationship between agent participation in voluntary pension schemes and some pension system features regarding its public and mandatory character as well as its current and predicted generosity. The empirical research involves aggregated cross-sectional data for over 20 OECD countries. Regression modeling as well as agglomerative hierarchical clustering and k-means clustering is employed to test the above-mentioned relationship. The results, suggest that aggregate data do not confirm the existence of myopia on pension decisions. In countries with less generous pension systems, voluntary schemes are more popular and better covered by working population. This suggests that people adapt to the pension system in their country and take its generosity as well as the relation between public and private character into account when deciding about the participation in voluntary pension schemes. Therefore, myopia may not support a greater state's involvement in a pension system. This refers to both public management of the pension system as well as the broad scope of obligatory pension schemes. The results do not question the role of the state in a pension system, they deliver only an argument in favor of the rationalization of this role. (original abstract)

Autorzy starają się odpowiedzieć na pytanie, czy obciążenie behawioralne, jakim jest krótkowzroczność (myopia) w zakresie indywidualnych decyzji emerytalnych faktycznie występuje i uzasadnia istotną rolę państwa w systemie emerytalnym w celu zapewnienia odpowiedniej adekwatności dochodowej. Analizie poddają zależność pomiędzy uczestnictwem obywateli w dobrowolnych planach emerytalnych i wybranymi cechami systemu egzemplarz redakcyjny Key Text emerytalnego, charakteryzującymi jego publiczny i obowiązkowy charakter, jak również jego obecną i oczekiwaną hojność. Przeprowadzone badanie empiryczne obejmuje ponad 20 krajów OECD i oparte jest na danych przekrojowych z okresu 2011-2013. Wykorzystano w nim metody modelowania ekonometrycznego oraz wielowymiarowej analizy statystycznej. Uzyskane wyniki wskazują, że dane zagregowane do poziomu makro nie potwierdzają występowania zjawiska myopii w decyzjach emerytalnych. W krajach z mniej hojnymi systemami emerytalnymi uczestnictwo osób pracujących w dobrowolnych planach emerytalnych jest bardziej powszechne. To sugeruje, że ludzie przyzwyczajają się do obowiązującego w danym kraju systemu emerytalnego i uwzględniają jego hojność i relację między publicznym i prywatnym segmentem w podejmowanych decyzjach o uczestnictwie w dobrowolnych planach emerytalnych. Dlatego myopia nie może być argumentem wspierającym dominującą rolę państwa w systemie emerytalnym. Dotyczy to zarówno publicznego zarządzania systemem emerytalnym, jak i szerokiego zakresu obowiązkowego systemu emerytalnego. Uzyskane wyniki nie kwestionują roli państwa w zabezpieczeniu emerytalnym, stanowią tylko argument za jej racjonalizacją. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Pension schemes; Retirement savings; States' role in economy; Personal decision making

PL

System emerytalny; Oszczędności emerytalne; Rola państwa w gospodarce; Podejmowanie decyzji osobistych

• Czasopismo: Ekonomista
• Rocznik: 2018
• Numer: nr 1
• Strony: 68--88

Twórcy

autor

Filip Chybalski

• Lodz University of Technology

autor

Edyta Marcinkiewicz

• Lodz University of Technology

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